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LESSONS FROM RENEWABLE ENERGY DIFFUSION FOR CARBON 
DIOXIDE REMOVAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Anthony E. Chaveza1 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 To avoid the diastrous affects of climate 
change, society will need to deploy carbon dioxide 
removal technologies (“CDR”), quite probably in 
large quantities. However, CDR technologies are 
undeveloped and deployed at only fractions of the 
amount necessary. Thus, we need to establish a set of 
policies that will accelerate the development and 
deployment of CDR. Patterns of technology diffusion 
provide important insight into the development of 
effective policies to promote the innovation and 
installation of new technologies. The dissemination of 
new technologies tends to follow a recurring pattern 
called the S curve. This pattern includes a slow initial 
adoption, a take-off phase, and then slow dissemination 
to the remaining population. Recently, experience with 
the development of renewable energy followed this 
pattern. Renewable energy’s growth not only 
demonstrates this diffusion pattern, it reveals the 
effectiveness of certain policies that promoted 
diffusion. It also illustrates the difficulties that can 
arise when policies do not match a technology’s 
location on the S curve. 
 
 
 
a1 Professor of Law, Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky 
University. Thanks to the participants at the 2018 International Conference on 
Negative CO2 Emissions and at the 2019 Achieving Net Zero Conference for their 
comments on this topic. Special thanks to Julie Allen, Jarrod Bentley, Courtney 
Gerrein, and Charles Stone for their research assistance. I am also grateful to Deans 
Judith Daar and Michael Whiteman and the Chase College of Law for supporting 
this effort.  Special thanks to the editors of the Fordham Environmental Law 
Review for their dedication and contributions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 This paper will consider the possible effectiveness of these 
policies in developing carbon dioxide removal technologies. In an 
earlier paper, I looked at renewable portfolio standards (“RPSs”), 
which mandate quantities of renewables, as a means to incentivize 
deployment. Accordingly, this paper will focus on price regulations, 
typically in the form of price subsidies (“FITs”) or tenders 
(competitive auctions). It also considers secondary policies – primarily 
tax credits and cash grants – that enhance the effectiveness of the 
primary policy.  
 
 This review of renewable energy diffusion and the policies that 
supported it helps to construct a set of principles and policies that can 
accelerate the diffusion of CDR technologies. These policies will need 
to reflect the differentiation of technologies and geographic resources, 
provide a stable policy environment to encourage investment, and 
incorporate mechanisms to respond to changing technological and 
market conditions.  
 
 Many aspects of renewable energy policies should be able to 
facilitate CDR development. RPSs can provide an overall structure 
that will assure installations continue at a steady pace. They also 
incentivize acquisition of the lowest-cost technologies, that help 
contain overall expenditures and encourage continued innovation. 
FITs provide long-term subsidies that assure profitability, thereby 
encouraging investment into new technologies. Secondary policies, 
such as tax credits and cash grants, should be included because of their 
recognized effectiveness in enhancing the effectiveness of primary 
policies. As the CDR technologies mature, their costs will decline, thus 
causing a rush to install reduced-cost technologies at price-supported 
rates. Not only must the supporting policies be adjusted to contain their 
overall costs, governments should also transition to different policies 
that better reflect the new market realities. Thus, as technologies 
mature, FITs should be phased out in favor of policies, such as 
auctions, that can reduce installation prices.  
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF CDR IS CRUCIAL BUT OCCURING TOO 
SLOWLY 
 
 Because we have failed to rein in greenhouse gas emissions, 
planetary warming is likely to exceed either the 1.5°C target required 
to avoid significant climate changes or even the 2°C target of the Paris 
Agreement. Most analyses conclude that to stay below these levels, we 
will need to deploy carbon dioxide (“CDR”) removal technologies. 
Unfortunately, these technologies are largely underdeveloped and few 
have been installed. Consequently, the number of installations must 
increase dramatically to sequester carbon at the rate required.  
 
 A. Surpassing Carbon Emissions Targets 
 
 Despite recent efforts to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, 
scientists still project that we will not avoid dangerous climate change. 
Models that demonstrate that this result is still avoidable almost 
exclusively rely upon carbon dioxide removal options to stay below 
this level of warming. Although a number of CDR technologies are 
theoretically possible, they all have limitations. More germane here, 
they all remain far from the level of development and installation 
required. 
 
 The parties to the 2015 Paris Agreement agreed to aim to hold 
the rise in warming to “well below 2.0°C.”1 They further agreed to 
pursue efforts to hold warming to 1.5°C.2 Recent analyses indicate that 
even warming to the 1.5°C level will cause serious regional 
consequences, such as extreme temperature warming, heavy 
precipitation, and droughts.3 The Paris Agreements and earlier global 
pacts targeted a rise of 2.0°C as the level to avoid because at that level 
“dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” will 
be unavoidable.4 Failure to hold warming to 1.5°C could result in 
additional global damages costing between $8 to $38 trillion by 
midcentury.5 
 
1 Adoption of the Paris Agreement, UNFCC Conference of the Parties, 
21st Sess., U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Dec. 12, 2015), art. 2(1)(a) (Paris 
Agreement) http://unfccc.int/files/home/application/pdf/paris_agreement.pdf. 
2 Id. 
3 Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al., Global Warming of 1.5°C, 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 8 (2018). 
4Lena R. Boysen et al., The Limits to Global-Warming Mitigation by 
Terrestrial Carbon Removal, 5 EARTH’S FUTURE 463, 463 (2017). 
5 Masson-Delmotte et al., supra note 3 at 256.  
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 Unfortunately, temperature rises of this magnitude are 
becoming increasingly likely. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (“IPCC”) concluded that we can emit only an 
additional 1,000 Gt of CO2 between 2011 and 2100 while retaining a 
66% chance of keeping warming under 2°C.6 With annual emissions 
approximating 37.5 Gt of CO2,
7 society already emitted one-fifth of 
this amount in just five years.8 Thus, scientists have estimated that our 
emissions will ensure a 1.5°C temperature rise in no more than 20 
years, and possibly much sooner.9 
 
 Consequently, integrated assessment models developed by the 
IPCC in its Fifth Assessment Report revealed that deployment of CDR 
technologies are likely a critical component for avoiding the 2°C level 
at the end of the century. The IPCC noted that 166 of 900 integrated 
assessment models yielded a 66% chance of warming not exceeding 
the 2°C level in 2100. 101 of these models required CDR to achieve 
this result.10 In fact, they rely upon CDR ramping up rapidly before 
midcentury to meet this target.11  
 
 Although 2100 is still many decades away, efforts to develop, 
test, and deploy CDR – at scale – must commence shortly. The IPCC 
models indicate that keeping warming below 1.5°C will require large-
scale deployment of CDR within 10 to 20 years.12 Even some 
projections to hold warming to 2.0°C will necessitate CDR 
deployment to begin as soon as the current decade.13  
 
6 EUROPEAN ACADAMIES SCIENCE ADVISORY COUNCIL COMMITTEE 
[EASAC], Negative Emission Technologies: What Role in Meeting Paris 
Agreement Targets?, 35 EASAC POL’Y REP. 1, 4 (2018). 
7 U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME [UNEP], The Emissions Gap Report 2019 3 
(2019) [hereinafter UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2019]. 
8 EASAC, supra note 6, at 5.  
9 David Kramer, Negative Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 73 PHYSICS TODAY 
44, 45 (2020). 
10 Christopher B. Field & Katharine J. Mach, Rightsizing Carbon Dioxide 
Removal, 356 SCIENCE 706, 707 (2017). 
11 NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE 
[NAS], NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECH. AND RELIABLE SEQUESTRATION: A RES. 
AGENDA 9 (2019). 
12 R. Stuart Haszeldine et al., Negative Emissions Technologies and 
Carbon Capture and Storage to Achieve the Paris Agreement Commitments, 376 
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 1, 19–20 (2018). 
13 Matthew D. Eisaman, et al., Indirect Ocean Capture of Atmospheric 
CO2: Part II. Understanding the Cost of Negative Emissions, 70 INT’L J. OF 
GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL (2018), 
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 B. The State of CDR Technologies  
 
 Carbon dioxide removal consists of a range of practices and 
technologies that can reduce the amount of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere. Costs and physical limitations, however, are likely to 
prevent any single technology from providing a “magic bullet” 
solution. Consequently, we will need to develop and deploy a portfolio 
of technologies.  
 CDR technologies remove CO2 from the atmosphere and 
sequester it underground permanently.14 These technologies fall into 
two categories. The first involves methods that augment natural 
processes.15 The second utilizes technological means to capture and 
bury the carbon dioxide.16  
 
 Although research on carbon dioxide removal is ongoing, the 
most promising approaches fall within the following eight 
categories:17 
 
• Afforestation and reforestation – Afforestation involves the 
planting of forests on grasslands or shrublands, and 
reforestation occurs when forests are planted on lands 
converted from forests to other purposes.18 The amount of CO2 
 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323636712_Indirect_ocean_capture_of_a
tmospheric_CO_2_Part_II_Understanding_the_cost_of_negative_emissions. 
14NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL [NRC],OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, 
CLIMATE INTERVENTION: CARBON DIOXIS REMOVAL AND RELIABLE 
SEQUESTRATION 33 (2015) (Carbon capture and utilization systems, on the other 
hand, apply the captured CO2 to a number of processes, including enhanced oil 
recovery, mineral carbonation, food and beverage carbonation, polymer processing, 
microalgae production, and enhanced coal bed methane recovery.); Jennifer Wilcox 
et al., Assessment of Reasonable Opportunities for Direct Air Capture, 12 ENVTL. 
RES. LETTERS 1, 2 (2017). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 NAS, supra note 11, at 45 (Another approach gaining attention recently 
is Coastal Blue Carbon. This consists of tidal wetlands and seagrasses, which 
capture and sequester carbon through plant growth and the subsequent burial of this 
plant organic carbon residue.); Id. at 46 (While these areas are among the most 
robust on earth at sequestering carbon, their current global sequestration totals only 
0.84 GtCO2 per year.); Id. at 47 (However, scientists have projected that this rate 
could more than double through the restoration and creation of coastal wetlands.).  
18 UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2017: A UN Environment Synthese 
Report 60 (2017.) [hereinafter UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2017]; NRC supra 
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removed from the atmosphere by forestation depends upon a 
number of factors, including the availability of sufficient land, 
nutrients,19 and water;20 type and age of the trees;21 and 
precipitation and CO2 levels.22 Possible sequestration from 
these activities could range from 1.5 to 14 GtCO2 (billion tons 
of carbon dioxide) per year by 2030.23  
 
• Biochar – Pyrolysis stabilizes biomass in biochar, which is 
then buried in soil.24 Biochar constitutes a negative emissions 
technology because it fixes atmospheric CO2 in a stable form 
that can be easily sequestered.25 Additionally, biochar can 
provide several co-benefits. These include increasing soil 
fertility and improving water and nutrient retention.26 Scientists 
project that biochar can sequester as much as 1 GtCO2 per year 
by 2030, and possibly up to 9.5 GtCO2, by 2100.27  
 
• Bioenergy carbon capture and sequestration (“BECCS”) – 
Combining carbon capture and sequestration technology with 
the burning of biomass in the form of agricultural and forest 
residues, municipal wastes, and cultivated crops in power 
plants can have net negative CO2 emissions.
28 Since biomass 
burning is in theory carbon neutral, and in practice low 
carbon, the capture and sequestration of the system’s 
 
note 14, at 39 (These processes are necessitated by deforestation, which causes 
approximately 10% of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.).  
19 EASAC, supra note 6, at 17.  
20 Duncan McLaren, Negatonnes—An Initial Assessment of the Potential 
For Negative Emission Techniques to Contribute Safely and Fairly to Meeting 
Carbon Budgets in the 21st Century, 1 FRIENDS OF THE EARTH 1, 20 (2011), 
http://www.homepages.ed.ac.uk/shs/Climatechange/Carbon%20sequestration/negat
onnes.pdf. 
21 NRC, supra note 14, at 40 (In general, net CO2 removal peaks within 
30-40 years, and then it declines to zero as the forest matures. ).  
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2017, supra note 18, at 62.  
25 Niall McGlashan et al., High-Level Techno-Economic Assessment of 
Negative Emissions Technologies, 90 PROCESS SAFETY & ENVTL. PROTECTION 
501, 503 (2012), 
26 UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2017, supra note 18, at 62. 
27 McGlashan, supra note 25, at 503. 
28 Matthew C. Nisbet, The Carbon Removal Debate, INST. FOR CARBON 
REMOVAL L. AND POL’Y 1, 9 (Dec. 2019), 
https://www.american.edu/sis/centers/carbon-removal/upload/carbon-removal-
debate.pdf. 
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emissions results in net negative emissions.29 A critical 
advantage of BECCS as a carbon dioxide removal technology 
is that it also produces a salable product, electricity.30 BECCS 
could sequester between 2 and 18 GtCO2 per year.
31   
 
• Direct air capture and carbon sequestration (“DACCS”) – 
This involves directly capturing ambient air, separating the 
CO2, and then sequestering it underground.
32 DACCS 
technology is still at the developmental stage. While it may 
eventually provide up to half of the required CO2 storage, it 
will necessitate significant energy and land resources to 
operate at this scale.33 DACCS has the technical potential to 
sequester as much as 20 GtCO2 annually, but actual 
sequestration is most likely to range from 2 to 5 GtCO2 per 
year.34  
 
• Enhanced weathering – Atmospheric CO2 naturally forms a 
chemical bond with reactive minerals.35 The natural 
weathering process will remove atmospheric carbon, but it will 
require 100,000 years to return the climate to its preindustrial 
level.36 Enhanced weathering augments the natural weathering 
process. It involves mining and grinding particular minerals to 
small grain sizes to increase their surface area exposed for 
weathering.37 This method likely can sequester only 0.7 to 3.7 
GtCO2 per year.
38 
 
 
29 McLaren, supra note 20, at 17. 
30 McGlashan, supra note 25, at 504. 
31 UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2017, supra note 18, at 62;. see also 
Elmar Kriegler et al., Is Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Removal a Gamer Changer 
for Climate Change Mitigation?, 118 CLIMATE CHANGE 45-57, 55 (May, 2013) 
(projecting BECCS deployment limited to a removal of 14-15 GtCO2 per year). 
32 NAS, supra note 11, at 39. 
33 Kramer, supra note 9, at 49. 
34 Id. at 64. 
35 NAS, supra note 11, at 39. 
36 Jeremy Deaton, Earth’s “Weathering Thermostat” Keeps Climate in 
Check Over Very Long Periods of Time, CLEANTECHNICA (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://cleantechnica.com/2017/09/18/earths-weathering-thermostat-keeps-climate-
check-long-periods-time/. 
37 Jessica Strefler et al., Potential and Costs of Carbon Dioxide Removal 
by Enhanced Weathering of Rocks, 13 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 1–2 (2018). 
38 UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2017, supra note 18, at 64. 
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• Land management – Soils lose carbon through oxidation, such 
as when they are plowed.39 In fact, agricultural practices are 
responsible for 10-12% of anthropogenic greenhouse gases.40 
Appropriate land management practices can increase soil 
carbon capture and reduce soil carbon losses.41 These practices 
include accelerating regeneration after disturbance and 
lengthening crop rotations.42 Possible sequestration from 
agricultural land management practices may be as high as 5.2 
GtCO2 per year.43  
 
• Ocean alkalinity enhancement – Adding alkaline materials to 
the ocean increases the amount of carbon the ocean absorbs.44 
Ocean alkalinity enhancement accelerates ocean carbon uptake 
and at the same time reverses ocean acidification.45 If operated 
at the appropriate scale, this method could sequester sufficient 
carbon to return the atmosphere to its pre-industrial state.46 
 
• Ocean fertilization – Depositing nutrients, such as iron, 
nitrogen or phosphorous, into the ocean stimulates the growth 
of phytoplankton, which consume CO2.
47 Scientists project that 
ocean fertilization could remove up to 3.7 GtCO2 per year.48  
 
 Several considerations regarding these technologies are 
important. First, we cannot rely upon developing a single technology; 
instead, will need to develop a portfolio of technologies.49  Second, 
 
39 McLaren, supra note 20, at 21. 
40 Stefan Frank et al., Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Agriculture 
Without Compromising Food Security?, 12 ENVT’L. RES. LETTERS 1, 2 (2017). 
41 UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2017, supra note 18, at 61. 
42 NAS, supra note 11, at 39. 
43 NRC, supra note 14, at 44. 
44 Id.  
45 Andrew Lenton, et al., Assessing Carbon Dioxide Removal through 
Global and Regional Ocean Alkalinization under High and Low Emission 
Pathways, 9 EARTH SYS. DYMANICS 339, 340 (2018). 
46 T. Kruger, Increasing the Alkalinity of the Ocean to Enhance its 
Capacity to Act as a Carbon Sink and to Counteract the Effect of Ocean 
Acidification, GEOCONVENTION 4 (2010), 
http://www.searchanddiscovery.com/abstracts/pdf/2014/90172cspg/abstracts/ndx_k
rug.pdf.  
47 EASAC, supra note 6, at 27. 
48 NRC, supra note 14, at 61. 
49 UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2019, supra note 7, at 3 (This is apparent 
for several reasons. First, current global CO2 emissions approximate 37.5 GtCO2 
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physical constraints limit the actual amount of CO2 that every method 
can sequester.50 Third, “significant scientific gaps” exist for nearly all 
CDR technologies.51 Fourth, few CDR methods, if any, are ready to be 
deployed at the scale required.52  
 
 Thus, while we can anticipate the need to utilize CDR 
technologies, they remain substantially underdeveloped. We need to 
institute policies that will encourage CDR’s development and 
deployment..  
 
 
per year.); NAS, supra note 11, at 4 (As indicated above, no single technology, 
except possibly ocean alkalinization, will be able to keep pace with these annual 
emissions, let alone actually reduce the amount of atmospheric CO2. Furthermore, a 
broad portfolio of technologies will be less expensive and less disruptive; 
diversification will also help manage the risks of untested technologies.).  
50 UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2019, supra note 7, at 10-11; EASAC, 
supra note 6, at 12-13 (For several such limitations. In addition, several CDR 
approaches may compete with one another. BECCS, afforestation, reforestation, 
DACCS, and enhanced weathering all may draw upon the same land and water 
resources.); McLaren, supra note 20, at 17 (Moreover, methods that rely upon 
reactions with minerals – such as weathering and alkalinization – may confront 
limitations deriving from the quantity of minerals that must be extracted, 
processed, and transported.).  
51 NAS, supra note 11, at 13;. Haszeldine, et al., supra note 12, at 11 
(Many CDR technologies are little more than concepts and operate only as pilot 
projects.); NAS, supra note 11, at 7 (Some have not yet even been tried in the 
field.).  
52 Vassilis Stavrakas, Niki-Artemis Spyridaki & Alexandros Flamos, 
Striving towards the Deployment of Bio-Energy with Carbon Capture and Storage 
(“BECCS”): A Review of Research Priorities and Assessment Needs, 
SUSTAINABILITY MDPI 2 (2018) (BECCS, for example, is considered among the 
most promising of the CDR technologies.); Wil Burns & Simon Nicholson, 
Bioenergy and Carbon Capture with Storage (“BECCS”): the Prospects and 
Challenges of an Emerging Climate Policy Response, 7 J. Envt’l. Stud. & Sci. 527, 
529 (2017) (Current BECCS operations, however, consist of only fifteen pilot 
plants and one commercial plant.); Nisbet, supra note 28, at 7 (Nevertheless, the 
IPCC scenarios that rely on BECCS to keep warming under 2.0°C require that 
BECCS plants be deployed in the tens of thousands over the next few decades.); 
Glen P. Peters et al., Key Indicators to Track Current Progress and Future 
Ambition of the Paris Agreement, 121 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 4 (2017) 
(Similarly, these scenarios anticipate that several thousand DACCS plants will be 
operating by 2030; planned construction, however, only numbers in the tens.); Niall 
R. McGlashan et al., Negative Emissions Technologies, GRANTHAM INST. FOR 
CLIMATE CHANGE BRIEFING PAPER NO 8 LONDON IMPERIAL COLLEGE 1, 15 (Oct. 
2012) (Finally, deploying biochar at the necessary scale would require an increase 
of over 63 times the current charcoal production capacity.).  
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II. DIFFUSION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
 To best encourage the development and deployment of CDR 
technologies, we need to consider the historic patterns of technology 
diffusion. The distribution of new technologies typically follows a 
recurring pattern. These patterns proceed on a path reflecting the 
technologies’ initial uncertainty, acceleration of their adoption as they 
become technologically mature, and then saturation of the market. 
Researchers have recognized a number of factors that drive these 
patterns. Examining these patterns informs expectations for future 
technology dissemination, the choice of policies to accelerate their 
distribution, the means to augment their diffusion, and inflection 
points where policies may need to change.  
 
 Technology “diffusion” identifies the process by which “an 
innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among 
members of a social system.”53 Diffusion modeling informs the 
understanding of technology growth.54 It illustrates that the market 
share of new technologies does not grow linearly; instead, it typically 
follows an “S” shape.55  
 
 Gabriel Tarde first developed diffusion theory in 1903, 
recognizing the S shape that it follows.56 Subsequently, scientists have 
applied diffusion models to analyze the adoption of numerous 
technologies, including cars, televisions, computers, other consumer 
goods, and non-commercial phenomena.57 Applying diffusion-models 
 
53 G. Joga Rao, S.K Shrivastava, & Gouse Baig, Diffusion Modeling and 
Implementation of Renewable Energy Technologies in India, 3 INT’L ADVANCED 
RES. J. IN SCI., ENGINEERING & TECH. 106, 110 (2016). 
54 K. Usha Rao & V.V.N. Kishore, A Review of Technology Diffusion 
Models with Special Reference to Renewable Energy Technologies, 14 
RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVIEWS 1070, 1075. (2010). 
55 Stephen W. Davies & Ivan Diaz-Rainey, The Patterns of Induced 
Diffusion: Evidence from the International Diffusion of Wind Energy, 78 TECH. 
FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 1227, 1235 (2011)..  
56 Cinderella Dube & Victor Gumbo, Diffusion of Innovation and the 
Technology Adoption Curve: Where Are We? The Zimbabwean Experience, Bus. & 
Mgmt. Stud. vol. 3, No. 3 (Sept. 2017) 34-52, 36 (Technology diffusion derives 
from the recognition of growth patterns of cell colonies in a medium. Colony 
growth reaches a saturation point because of nutrient or space limitations. 
Similarly, technology diffusion levels off as it approaches the number of potential 
adopters.); Rao, supra note 73, at 110.  
57 Dube, supra note 56 (These non-commercial phenomena includes 
things such as fatal car accidents, major nuclear accidents, and deaths from AIDS.).  
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analysis helps design and assess supporting policies.58 For instance, 
new technologies typically require initial supporting policies before 
achieving diffusion and maturity, and maintaining these policies 
during later stages may be counterproductive.59 
 
 In the 1950’s and 1960’s, economists became more engaged in 
diffusion analysis. They especially focused on understanding the 
patterns of diffusion.60 The general pattern of technology diffusion 
consists of a slow start, acceration to a peak, and then a slowing as 
saturation occurs.61 Analysts refer to this pattern as the S curve, as 
reflected below: 
 
Figure 162
 
 
 
58 Rao, supra note 54, at 1075. 
59 Stéphane Isoard & Antonio Soria, Technical Change Dynamics: 
Evidence from the Emerging Renewable Energy Technologies, 23 ENERGY ECON. 
619, 631 (2001). 
60 Davies & Diaz-Rainey, supra note 75, at 1229.  
61 International Energy Agency [IEA], Deploying Renewables 
201120112011: Best and Future Policy Practice 97 (2011) [hereinafter IEA, 
Deploying Renewables]. 
62 The Adoption Curve, INVESTAURA (Aug. 15, 2019), 
http://www.business-planning-for-managers.com/main-courses/marketing-
sales/marketing/the-adoption-curve/.  
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The S curve begins with a relatively flat inception stage. During this 
stage, the technology first appears in commercial markets. Costs, 
however, remain relatively high, suppressing purchases.63 Next, in the 
take-off phase, the market for the technology expands quickly, and 
costs begin to fall.64 In the final stage, consolidation,65 growth flattens 
as the market approaches saturation.66 Development of renewable 
energy followed the S-curve pattern, as evidenced by its rate of 
adoption. Production of the first trillion watts of renewable energy 
required 40 years; the second trillion needed only 5 years.67  
 
 As technologies progress through these stages, different 
barriers to deployment arise, often necessitating adjustments to 
supporting policies.68 During the inception phase, developers focus on 
establishing the costs and potential of technologies. Typically, this 
involves the construction of pilot or demonstration plants, developing 
the requisite administrative infrastructure to process related permit 
applications, and establishing the necessary supply chains.69 Policy 
considerations in the inception phase include policies that set the 
groundwork for long-term favorable conditions and that compensate 
for the high costs at this stage.70  
 
 The take-off phase presents different challenges. During this 
stage, the infrastructure investments of the inception phase facilitate 
fast growth of installed capacity until markets approach saturation.71 
At this stage, policies must be stable yet flexible. Stability is necessary 
to maintain investor confidence;72 flexibility is required because 
 
63 IEA, Deploying Renewables, supra note 61, at 97. 
64 Id.  
65 Id. 
66 Rao, supra note 53, at 110. 
67 Jeremy Hodges, Global Green Energy Capacity Surpasses a Trillion 
Watts, BLOOMBERG L. ENV’T. & ENERGY REP. (Aug. 2, 2018, 11:00 AM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/global-green-energy-
capacity-surpasses-a-trillion-watts. 
68 IEA, Deploying Renewables, supra note 61, at 97-98. 
69 Id. at 101. 
70 Id. at 101-02 (A particular concern at this stage is the technological 
“valley of death,” during which technologies requiring large scale demonstration 
lack the requisite financing. These risks especially arise for large-scale projects that 
require substantial funding to develop and construct demonstration models.).  
71 Id. at 110. 
72 Id. at 103; Davies, supra note 55, at 1236. (The most successful systems 
have had such policy continuity.).  
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support costs can rise dramatically as deployments take off.73 Either 
flexible policies or those that are transitional in nature best respond to 
issues arising at this stage.74 Accordingly, at this stage incentives must 
decrease over time to prevent policy costs from skyrocketing.75   
 
 Finally, in the saturation or consolidation stage, the issues are 
much simpler. At this stage, most of the market has already adopted 
the technology, and the remaining market consists of last adopters, 
identified as “laggards.”76 Thus, the issues largely consist of 
dissemination to these remaining adopters and integration of the 
technologies at substantial levels of adoption.77 
 
 Over time, economists have refined their analysis of diffusion 
patterns, focusing on inducing diffusion, accelerating diffusion, and 
identifying diffusion pivot points. Induced diffusion involves 
interventions that alter the speed or total level of diffusion of an 
innovation.78 Although physical limitations can cap diffusion levels, 
government policies targeting specific technologies can accelerate 
diffusion.79 Induced diffusion can result from policies that facilitate 
adoption or sustain the adoption process.80 Graphically, the changes to 
the typical S curve engendered by induced diffusion involve a shifting 
of the curve to the left (accelerated diffusion) or a higher end point 
(increased saturation).81 Absent sufficient policy interventions, 
diffusion will follow the typical pattern. Strong policy inducements, 
however, can favorably reshape the diffusion curve.82  
 
 The success of induced diffusion can depend upon a number of 
considerations, including supporting policies.83 Prime examples of the 
interaction of policy and diffusion come from the development of 
 
73 IEA, Deploying Renewables, supra note 61, at 102. 
74 Id. at 103. 
75 Id.  
76 Rao, supra note 53, at 110. 
77 IEA, Deploying Renewables, supra note 61, at 104. 
78 Sergio Giaccaria & Silvana Dalmazzone, Patterns of Induced Diffusion 
of Renewable Energy Capacity: The Role of Regulatory Design and 
Decentralization, 282 CARLO ALBERTO NOTEBOOKS 2 (2012). 
79 C. Nolden, The Governance of Innovation Diffusion – A Socio-
Technical Analysis of Energy Policy, EPJ Web of Conferences 33 (2012) at 2-3. 
80 Giaccaria & Dalmazzone, supra note 78, at 2. 
81 Ivan Diaz-Rainey, Induced Diffusion: Definition, Review and 
Suggestions for Further Research, SSRN ELECTRONIC J. 6–7 (2009). 
82 Davies, supra note 55, at 1237. 
83 Id. at 1229. 
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renewable energy. Many European countries successfully induced the 
diffusion of wind power.84 During its inception, these countries 
provided financial incentives for demonstration wind projects.85 The 
most successful European nations in inducing wind power’s diffusion 
enacted feed-in tariffs (“FITs”).86 Characteristics of FITs that 
facilitated diffusion included revenue certainty, policy continuity, and 
removal of non-price (primarily grid access) barriers.87 Support 
measures such as FITs helped renewable energy costs to decline, 
creating new demand. This triggered learning by doing88 and 
economies of scale,89 which pushed costs down further.90  
 
 Research into diffusion of renewable energy has identified 
several factors that facilitate cost reductions. These included 
experience with the technology, as exhibited through a learning curve 
analysis, and economies of scale.91 Technologies proceed down the 
learning curve in a recurring pattern. Research and development 
facilitate initial cost declines; then, performance standards dominate, 
and price reductions drive demand.92 As developers gain more 
experience with new technologies, they are able to increase 
 
84 Id. at 1235. 
85 Rao, supra note 54, at 1072-73. 
86 Davies, supra note 55, at 1236.  
87 Id.; see also Section III, infra subsec. A. 
88 Saed Alizamir, Francis de Véricourt, & Peng Sun, Efficient Feed-In-
Tariff Policies for Renewable, 64 OPERATIONS RES. 52, 53 (2016) (“Learning by 
doing” refers to a concept in economics that costs decline as production increases 
because manufacturers learn how to produce the technology more efficiently.); 
Björn A. Sandén & Christian Azar, Near-term Technology Policies for Long-Term 
Climate Targets – Economy Wide Versus Technology Specific Approaches, 
ENERGY POL’Y 1557, 1559–76, 1559 (2005) (In addition, labor becomes more 
skilled at production.) (These improvements also can generate positive feedbacks, 
which further benefit product development.).  
89 Sandén, supra note 88 (“Economies of scale” occur as production costs 
per unit of output fall as fixed costs get spread over an increasing volume of 
production. Rising production volumes also enable efficiencies through greater 
divisions of labor.).  
90 Malcolm Keay & David Robinson, The Limits of Auctions: Reflections 
on the Role of Central Purchaser Auctions for Long-Term Commitments in 
Electricity Systems, OXFORD INST. FOR ENERGY STUD. 4 (2019); Nolden, supra 
note 79, at 5–6 (One analyst concludes that for each doubling of installed capacity, 
prices fall by 7% because of economies of scale and supply chain efficiencies.).           
91 Rao, supra note 53, at 115. 
92 David Roberts, What Made Solar Panels So Cheap? Thank Government 
Policy., VOX (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-
environment/2018/11/20/18104206/solar-panels-cost-cheap-mit-clean-energy-
policy.  
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productivity through R&D, experimentation, and implementation.93 
This reduces time and labor costs, lowering unit costs of production.94 
  
 Awareness of the S-curve pattern informs policy development 
for technology incentivization and diffusion. Specifically, it indicates 
that the growth of technologies will usually follow a nonlinear pattern. 
Consequently, slow initial growth is foreseeable and should not, by 
itself, trigger policy changes.95 Policy stability enhances effectiveness. 
In fact, policy stability is a more important determinant of diffusion 
than financial support.96 Conversely, regular changes to policies limit 
their effectiveness.97  
 
 Renewable energy diffusion exhibited many of these 
characteristics. Government policies facilitated its development to the 
point where costs dropped as a result of learning and mass 
production.98 Renewables then proceeded along a path of research and 
development, demonstration models, market introduction, and 
diffusion.99 Economists have estimated that research and development, 
economies of scale, and learning-by-doing accounted for 60 percent of 
the cost decline of solar photovoltaic panels from 1980 to 2012.100 
Over a slightly longer period (1975 to 2015), the cost of PVs dropped 
99 percent.101 As the technology improved, economies of scale became 
the dominant source of cost reductions.102  
 
 The government policies that facilitated renewable energy 
diffusion included supply-side and demand-side approaches. Supply 
 
93 Rao, supra note 54, at 1073. 
94 Isoard, supra note 59, at 621. 
95 Davis, supra note 55, at 1235. 
96 Inga Boie, Determinants For the Market Diffusion of Renewable Energy 
Technologies, UNIVERSITY OF EXETER 242–43 (Nov. 2016) (unpublished Ph.D 
thesis, on file with University of Exeter).  
97 Rao, supra note 54, at 1074 (One example of the impact of policy 
uncertainty comes from the recurring expirations and extensions of the wind 
production tax credit in the United States, discussed more fully infra at Section 
III.E.). 
98 Id. at 1073. 
99 Rao, supra note 53, at 114; Nolden, supra note 79 at 3. (As technologies 
progress through these stages, supporting policies should be flexible; costs will 
usually have fallen sufficiently to render subsidies unnecessary.).   
100 Goksin Kavlak et al., Evaluating the Causes of Cost Reduction in 
Photovoltaic Modules, 123 ENERGY POLICY 700, 709 (2018). 
101 Roberts, supra note 92. 
102 Kavlak, McNerney, & Trancik, supra note 100, at 709. 
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side policies facilitate delivering new technologies to markets.103 Price 
subsidies are classic examples of such policies, and they can play 
critical roles in facilitating diffusion.104 Among such subsides, FITs 
especially have been successful in promoting diffusion by encouraging 
learning and reducing costs.105 Demand-side policies directly target 
consumption of the technology. For instance, renewable portfolio 
standards (“RPSs”) in the United States are exemplars of these 
approaches.106 RPSs mandate that electricity providers receive a 
particular portion of their electricity from renewable sources, thus 
necessitating the installation of those resources.107 Alternatively, tax 
credits, by reducing net installation costs, also stimulate demand.108 
Demand-side strategies, by stimulating demand for new technologies, 
generate production, which enhances learning-by-doing and 
economies of scale.109 Increased production can then reinforce these 
effects by reducing costs, accelerating economies of scale, and 
inducing further learning effects.110  
 
 To achieve these results, governments used policies that 
created financial incentives or imposed quantity regulations to 
generate demand for renewable energy.111 Government policies were 
critical to incentivizing private activity that drove down costs.112 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between cost and volume in the 
utility-scale solar power market. As solar power production and 
installation accelerated, production moved down the cost curve, 
 
103 Juliana Subtil Lacerda & Jeroen C. J. M. van den Bergh, International 
Diffusion of Renewable Energy Innovations: Lessons from the Lead Markets for 
Wind Power in China, Germany and USA, 7 ENERGIES 8236, 8240 (2014). 
104 Patrik Söderholm & Ger Klaassen, Wind Power in Europe: A 
Simultaneous Innovation–Diffusion Model, 36 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 163, 
183 (2007). 
105 Id.; UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, infra note 124 ( Experts credit FITs with 
incentivizing a substantial majority of renewable energy installations.).  
106 Lacerda, supra note 103, at 8251. 
107 Corey N. Allen, Untapped Renewable Energy Potential: Lessons for 
Reforming Virginia’s Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard from Texas and 
California, 35 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 117, 120 (2016). (RPSs are discussed more fully 
infra at Section III.D.).  
108 See Section III, infra subsec. E. 
109 Lacerda, supra note 103, at 8242-43. 
110 Isoard, supra note 59, at 620. 
111 Rao, supra note 54, at 1075. 
112 Id. at 709. 
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thereby further reducing costs.113 Experience demonstrates that costs 
of new technologies initially decline as the technology improves; then, 
costs fall in conjunction with increases in market volume.114  
 
Figure 2115 
 
 
 
 Renewable energy markets actually contain many sub-markets, 
and diffusion occurred uniquely within each. Thus, different 
technologies developed at separate paces; each in unique locations on 
their individual technology curves.116 Even individual technologies 
may fall at different stages of the curve in different geographic levels. 
Thus, local or national markets may be at one stage while the global 
 
113 Isoard, supra note 59, at 623; Kavlak, supra note 100, at 700 (The 
decline in PV costs and their resulting rapid increase in installations provide a 
recent example of this process.).  
114 Hans-Josef Fell, The Shift From Feed-In-Tariffs to Tenders is 
Hindering the Transformation of the Global Energy Supply to Renewable Energies 
15) (Policy Paper, Irena) (July 2017). 
115 Megan Mahajan, Plunging Prices Mean Building New Renewable 
Energy is Cheaper than Running Existing Coal, FORBES (Dec. 3, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2018/12/03/plunging-prices-mean-
building-new-renewable-energy-is-cheaper-than-running-existing-
coal/#1cd0aad831f3. 
116 IEA, Deploying Renewables, supra note 61, at 95.  
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technology curve may be at another.117 Because of these differences, 
governments must be alert to tailor policies to local circumstances.118 
This also suggests that policy makers should develop technology-
specific, rather than technology-neutral, policies.119 As a result, 
applying policies that allow for individualization of application to 
separate technologies is a critical consideration. 
 
 In conclusion, we can anticipate that the growth and diffusion 
of CDR technologies will likely follow a recurring pattern. Armed with 
this knowledge, governments can more accurately tailor policies to 
enhance their ability to increase technological diffusion while 
containing their costs. The experience of renewable energy diffusion, 
discussed next, illustrates how policies can support diffusion, but also 
highlights some of the problems that may arise if not diffused 
correctly. 
 
III. POLICIES SUPPORTING RENEWABLE ENERGY DIFFUSION 
 
 The development of renewable energy exhibited the S-curve 
pattern. This diffusion occurred in significant part because of a number 
of policies that facilitated investment in these technologies. This next 
section will examine these policies more closely and their effects on 
renewable energy deployment. 
 
 A. Feed-In Tariffs – The Basics 
 
 Feed-in tariffs (“FITs”) have been the most successful policy 
for incentivizing the investment in and diffusion of renewable energy. 
This is largely because they provide investors with certainty – a 
guaranteed, profitable return on their investments. Unfortunately, 
aspects of FITs that were instrumental in their success eventually 
 
117 Id. at 97; Jorrit Gosens, Fredrik Hedenus, Björn A. Sandén, Faster 
Market Growth of Wind and PV in Late Adopters Due to Global Experience Build-
up, ENERGY 131 (2017) 267-278, 275 (Not surprisingly, progress made in early-
adopter nations can benefit late adopter states. Typically, late adopters experience 
much faster growth rates, even if they have a lower Gross Domestic Product 
(“GDP”). Even when policies have limited effect in the initial markets, they may 
have a multiplier effect by accelerating growth in the markets of late-adopter 
nations. One estimate calculated that late-adopter countries were able to build out 
wind power nearly five times faster than the initial countries; solar could grow as 
much as 16 times faster.). 
118 IEA, Deploying Renewables, supra note 61, at 100. 
119 Id. 
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created conditions that necessitated that many countries abandon their 
FITs at the peak of their success. In other words, as technologies 
reached the take-off stage, policies that were appropriate in the initial 
phase needed to be modified under the new circumstances. This 
suggests that awareness of diffusion patterns can guide policy makers 
to tailor their policies to maximize effectiveness and control costs. 
 
 Germany and Spain first instituted elements of what were to 
become their FITs in the 1970’s and 1980’s.120 Subsequently, 
Germany enacted its FIT in 1991,121 and Spain followed in 1994.122 
Since then, FITs have become widely adopted. FITs remain the most 
prominent form of policy adopted to support renewable energy 
production.123 Sixty five nations,124 and 110 jurisdictions overall, use 
FITs.125 FITs have played particularly significant roles in Europe, and 
most countries in Asia use them, as well.126  
 
 Feed-in-tarrifs have been quite successful, too. Most studies 
have concluded that FITs significantly stimulated the growth of 
renewable energy, especially in nations at the initial stages of 
technology development.127 Often their performance has exceeded 
projections.128 Researchers consider FITs to be the primary cause of 
 
120 Lincoln L. Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-in Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. 
VA. L. REV. 937, 968 946 (2014) (In 1979, Germany passed a national competition 
law, which mandated purchases of renewable energy at avoided costs.) (Spain’s 
Law 82/1980 required network connection and guaranteed contract prices.).  
121 Yugo Tanaka, et al., Feed-in Tariff Pricing and Social Burden in 
Japan: Evaluating International Learning through a Policy Transfer, Approach, 6 
SOC. SCI. 2. (2017).  
122 Davies, supra note 120, at 969. 
123 REN21, Renewables 2017 GLOBAL STATUS REP. 122 (2017). 
124 UNEP, Feed-In Tariffs as a Policy Instrument for Promoting 
Renewable Energies & Green Economies in Developing Countries 4 (2012) 
[hereinafter, UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs]. 
125 REN21, supra note 142, at 21. 
126 Chris Lo, Renewable Energy: Are Feed-in Tariffs Going out of Style?, 
POWER TECH. (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.power-
technology.com/features/featurerenewable-energy-are-feed-in-tariffs-going-out-of-
style-5718419/ (The United States has some utility-based FITs and state-wide 
FITs.); Karlynn Cory et al., Feed-in Tariff Policy: Design, Implementation, and 
RPS Policy Interactions 9 (2009).   
127 Hojin Kang, Establishing a New Guideline for South Korea’s 
Renewable Portfolio Standard 19 (Aug. 2. 2016) (unpublished MS in Engineering 
and Management thesis, Massachusetts of Technology) (on file with the 
Massachusetts Instutite of Technology Library Archives). 
128 Tanaka, et al., supra note 121, at 5. 
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renewable energy growth in their founding states of Germany and 
Spain.129 Overall, analysts attribute 64% of global wind and 87% of 
solar photovoltaic (“PV”) installations to the use of FITs policies.130  
 
 Three particular components typify feed-in tariff 
agreements.131 The “feed-in” provision assures that generators of 
electricity from renewable sources will have access to the grid.132 The 
“tariff” requires utilities to purchase the electricity generated by 
designated sources at predetermined rates.133 Finally, FITs contracts 
are usually required to last an extended period of time, typically at least 
15-20 years.134 
 
 Feed-in tariffs essentially guarantee payments at above-cost 
rates to electricity producers through long-term contracts.135 FITs are 
production-based incentives, as distinct from incentives awarded for 
installation. Thus, FITs provide their benefits not when a renewable 
energy facility is built, but when it actually generates electricity.136 The 
theoretical basis supporting FITs is that assuring payment at a 
guaranteed price removes market risk from investors. This helps to 
attract capital.137 Indeed, the experience with FITs in Europe provides 
evidence that they succeeded.138  
 
129 Cory, supra note 126, at 1. 
130 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 5. 
131 Leah C. Stokes, The Politics of Renewable Energy Policies: The Case 
of Feed-in Tariffs in Ontario, Canada, ENERGY POLICY 56 (2013) 490-500, 490.   
132 Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 
1631–32 (2016) [hereinafter Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism]; UNEP, Feed-in 
Tariffs, supra note 124, at 57 (The tariff functions similarly to a “must take” clause 
in a power purchase agreement.); Solar Power Purchase Agreements, U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY [EPA], 
https://www.epa.gov/greenpower/solar-power-purchase-agreements (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2019) (In a power purchase agreement, a third-party developer owns and 
operates a renewable energy system, and a customer contracts to purchase the 
output of this system.); STOEL RIVES, LLP, THE LAW OF SOLAR: A GUIDE TO 
BUSINESS AND LEGAL ISSUES 27, 2 (5th ed. 2017) (The agreement then requires the 
customer to purchase the electricity generated by the operator.).  
133 Mormann, supra note 132, at 1631-32. 
134 IEA, supra note 61, at 79-80. 
135 Id. at 79. 
136 Toby Couture & Karlynn Cory, State Clean Energy Policies Analysis 
(SCEPA) : Project: An Analysis of Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariffs in the United 
States 2 (2009). 
137 Richard Schmalensee, Evaluating Policies to Increase Electricity 
Generation from Renewable Energy, 6 REV. OF ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 50 (2012). 
138 Cory et al., supra note 126, at 13. 
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  The 15-20 year length of FITs contracts plays an important 
role. Sometimes referred to as payment length or payment duration, 
this assures that generators will receive the FIT above-cost premium 
for an extended period.139 This guaranteed duration is a key component 
in providing a financial incentive to invest in a qualifying project.140  
 
 Long-term contracts provide other benefits, as well. With a 
longer period of application, the time over which costs will be 
recovered increases. This reduces the levelized cost for the project.141 
One analysis concluded that the reduced capital costs can lower the 
levelized costs by 10-30%.142 Long contracts assure stable revenue 
streams, which also minimize investor risk.143 Long-term contracts, as 
well as policy stability generally, provide assurance to the finance 
sector, too, which facilitates financing.144 The length and stability of 
FITs also encourages secondary industries, such as equipment supply, 
to make the necessary investments to assure the long-term prospects 
of the primary industry.145 Feed-in tariff legislation often also requires 
standardized contracts. Their use simplifies project development since 
it reduces or eliminates the negotiation process.146 
 
 The reimbursement rate set under FITs is critical.147 Policy 
makers select from three different means to calculate the rate: actual 
cost, avoided cost or value, or market price plus premium. A cost-
based price starts with the cost of electricity generation from the 
renewable source and adds an amount to provide a guaranteed 
 
139 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 41. 
140Gustav Resch et al., Feed-in Tariffs and Quotas for Renewable Energy 
in Europe, CESIFO DICE REPORT 26 (Apr. 2007). 
141 Couture, supra note 136, at 17. (“Levelized cost” refers to the lifetime 
costs of producing electricity from a source divided by the amount of energy 
produced. DOE Office of Indian Energy, Levelized Cost of Energy (“LCOE”)) 
(updated). 
142 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 7. 
143 Couture, supra note 136, at 31. 
144 IEA, supra note 61, at 79. 
145 Id. at 84. (For an example of a policy lacking such stability and the 
effect on the primary and supporting industries of this uncertainty.); see also 
Section III, infra subsec. E. (discussion of the wind power production tax credit). 
146 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 70. 
147 Sonal Patel, The Feed-in Tariff Factor, POWERMAG (Aug. 31, 2010), 
https://www.powermag.com/the-feed-in-tariff-factor/ (noting that policy makers 
seek to set FITs rates so as to drive renewable energy deployment). 
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return.148 As such, this rate is independent of the market price.149 Cost-
based rates are most likely to assure developers and investors with their 
guaranteed returns. Consequently, this method is particularly effective 
in promoting market growth.150 Since the cost-based system derives 
from the cost to generate electricity, the method inherently 
differentiates among sources. This supports portfolio 
diversification.151 A drawback of this system is that it has higher 
administrative costs because of the time and expertise required to 
calculate accurate rates.152 Because of its assurance of a reasonable 
return, the cost-based system was the most successful method to 
incentivize renewable energy, and it was the most common method in 
Europe.153  
 
 Cost-based rates utilize one of three methods. The first, a fixed-
price system, establishes a guaranteed price for a fixed period, and 
market fluctuations do not alter the rate.154 The second, a premium-
price method, provides a premium on top of the wholesale market 
price. To minimize the effect of market fluctuations, some jurisdictions 
set floors and ceilings for these rates.155 The third, a spot-market 
system, sets a guaranteed payment level, and the FIT is determined as 
the difference between the guaranteed payment level and the wholesale 
market price.156  
 
 A second group of methods used to set FITs rates relies upon 
external considerations. One category considers the fossil fuel costs 
avoided through utilization of renewable energy.157 Another approach 
attempts to set a value for the services provided by the alternative 
 
148 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 38. 
149 Kang, supra note 127, at 29.  
150 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 40. 
151 Id. at 41.  
152 Id.  
153 Couture, supra note 136, at 3. 
154 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 44.  
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 82-83 (Another consideration when setting rates involves the 
availability of other, cost-impacting incentives. For instance, some jurisdictions 
utilize an investment tax credit, which reduces the net investment cost for 
projects.); Yoshihiro Yamamoto, Feed-in Tariffs Combined with Capital Subsidies 
for Promoting the Adoption of Residential Photovoltaic Systems, 111 ENERGY 
POLICY 312, 312 (2017) (The presence of such subsidies can reduce the cost of 
financing.); UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 83 (This commensurately 
lowers the required FIT level.).  
157 Couture, supra note 136, at 2. 
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energy source by considering a number of avoided costs and resulting 
benefits.158 These factors may include the costs of avoidance of 
numerous harms: climate change impacts, adverse health effects, air 
pollutants, and others.159 Value-based methods are less accurate means 
to price FITs rates since many of their components are difficult to price 
accurately and the eventual rate is unlikely to approximate the value 
of different technologies.160 On the other hand, value-based 
approaches are simpler to implement since they do not require 
technology-by-technology determinations, but depend upon the 
valuation of other factors.161  
 
 FITs can readily facilitate the development of multiple 
technologies.162 One particular means to accomplish this is tariff 
differentiation. This refers to assigning unique rates for separate 
technologies based upon a range of factors. FITs can range from 
undifferentiated to highly differentiated, upon a broad range of 
considerations.163 Such differentiation can support various 
technologies and even subsets of technologies (such as onshore and 
 
158 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 38. 
159John Farrell, How to Phase out Incentives and Grow Solar Energy, 
GRIST (May 5, 2014), https://grist.org/article/how-to-phase-out-incentives-and-
grow-solar-energy/ (Minnesota recently developed a similar policy with its value of 
solar policy.); John Farrell, Minnesota’s Value of Solar: Can a Northern State’s 
New Solar Policy Defuse Distributed Generation Battles?, INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-
RELIANCE (2014), https://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/MN-Value-of-Solar-
from-ILSR.pdf (The system, adopted in 2014, provides that utilities pay a price for 
solar energy that incorporates the value of avoiding the purchase of electricity from 
polluting sources, the building of additional power plants, and the additional wear 
and tear on the electric grid.). 
160 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 41. 
161 Id.; Kang, supra note 127, at 29 (Alternatively, the FITs rate can be 
based on the market price for electricity. Under this rate structure, generators 
receive the electricity market price plus a predetermined premium.) (Often called a 
feed-in premium system, it differs from the other methods by being market 
dependent. A market-dependent method exposes investors to a risk that the market 
price will not be sufficient to provide the expected return on investment.); 
Shahrouz Abolhosseini & Almas Heshmati, The Main Support Mechanisms To 
Finance Renewable Energy Development, 40 RENEWABLE SUSTAINABLE ENERGY 
REVIEWS 876, 876-88 (2014) (On the other hand, analysts have found that market-
independent systems provide greater investment security, which tends to lower 
financing costs.); Q.Y. Yan, et al., Overall Review of Feed-In Tariff and Renewable 
Portfolio Standard Policy: A Perspective of China, EARTH ENVTL. SCIENCE 40 
(2016). (Although several European nations have recently enacted market-
dependent FITs, most countries use market-independent systems.). 
162 Couture, supra note 136, at 5. 
163 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 35. 
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offshore wind). This can assure diversity in technologies with the 
additional benefit of higher levels of technology penetration.164 FITs 
can also differentiate based upon project size, which can support large, 
industrial facilities as well as small-scale or residential projects.165 
Policies can also differentiate by resource quality, which involves 
recognition of different resource availability at particular sites. This 
allows for higher prices where resources are less abundant (less windy 
or sunny, for instance).166 Other types of differentiation have included 
technology application (ground- or roof-mounted photovoltaics), 
ownership type (public or private utility), and local content percentage 
(to stimulate local industries and employment).167 Of course, the 
greater the differentiation of a FIT scheme, the higher the 
administrative costs that it will necessitate.168 
 
 A critical issue to address when structuring FITs involves the 
recovery of the FITs premium. As discussed, FITs typically mandate 
the payment of a premium exceeding the cost of generating 
electricity.169 The utility customers pay the cost of the electricity they 
use; the question remains of covering the premium. FITs can allocate 
this cost recovery to ratepayers; alternatively, the state can cover this 
premium, effectively shifting payment to the taxpayers.170 Policy 
makers tend to favor ratepayer payment, viewing it as a more secure 
and reliable means – payments included as part of a state budget can 
become targets in budget cutting times.171   
 
 
 
 
 
164 Couture, supra note 136, at 18. 
165 Id. at 4. 
166 Id. at 18. 
167 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 35. 
168 Id. at 38. 
169Christopher Barry, Feed-in Tariffs: A Policy Mechanism for Renewable 
Energy Growth, (Dec. 13, 2016), 
http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2016/ph240/barry2/. 
170 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 81; id. (States could also 
choose a hybrid approach, which requires ratepayers to cover a portion of the 
premium and shifts the remainder to the state budget.).  
171 Id.; Steven Ferrey, Against the Wind—Sustainability, Migration, 
Presidential Discretion, 44 COLUM. J. OF ENVTL. L. 341, 358 (2019) (An example 
of the unreliability of subsidies incorporated in a state’s budget comes from the 
production tax credit provided by the United States for wind power. Congress 
allowed it to expire six times before extending it.); see Section III, infra subsec. E.  
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 B. Feed-In Tariffs – Illustrative Experiences 
 
 While FITs are now widespread, the experiences of several 
nations – particularly those of Germany, Spain, and China – illustrate 
many of the policy’s strengths and weaknesses. Germany and Spain, 
the two founders of the FIT scheme, demonstrate FITs at their most 
effective. However, they also highlight that inherent consequences of 
successful FITs policies can necessitate substantial modifications, if 
not outright abandonment. China, on the other hand, illustrates issues 
that arise when FITs are adopted in larger, regionally diverse countries. 
Its experience also suggests an approach to avoid some of the problems 
confronted by Germany and Spain. 
 
  1. Germany 
 
 As noted previously, in 1979, Germany, adopted a national 
competition law, mandating purchases of renewable energy at avoided 
costs.172 Twelve years later, Germany enacted its FIT, which required 
the purchase of renewable energy through long-term, fixed-price 
contracts.173 Under the German FIT, a surcharge on the bills of 
residential customers covered the renewable energy subsidies.174 
Germany modified its subsidies several times, most significantly in 
2000.175 The 2000 amendments mandated that FITs contracts last for 
at least 20-year terms and at prices that exceeded generators’ costs.176 
  
 Germany’s feed-in tariff (called the Erneuerbare-Energien-
Gesetz (“EEG”) (Renewable Energy Sources Act) after the 2000 
 
172 Davies, supra note 120, at 946. 
173 Michael Ferguson et al., Green America: Renewable Standards, Tax 
Credits, and What’s Next, S & P GLOBAL (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.spglobal.com/en/research-insights/articles/green-america-renewable-
standards-tax-credits-and-whats-next. 
174 Amy Gahran, Germany’s Course Correction on Solar Growth, 
GREENTECH MEDIA (Nov. 3, 2016), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/germanys-course-correction-on-
solar-growth#gs.12ZPE2s. 
175 Ferguson, supra note 173, at 13. 
176 David Suzuki, Feed-in Tariffs Help Renewable Energy Grow, 
GEORGIA STRAIGHT (June 14, 2016), 
https://www.straight.com/news/717431/david-suzuki-feed-tariffs-help-renewable-
energy-grow. 
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amendments)177 facilitated a rapid growth in the country’s renewable 
energy generation. In the decade from 1990 to 2000, renewable energy 
nearly doubled, rising from 3.4% to 6.2% of German electricity 
production. By 2016, it had jumped to 31.7%.178 As of 2017, Germany 
had solar PV capacity of 38 GW,179 despite having the solar potential 
of Alaska.180  
 
 Several aspects of Germany’s FIT led to its success. The FIT 
rate adjusted according to a project’s location. This adaptibility 
increased the viability of projects in sub-optimal locations, which 
promoted a more geographically-balanced distribution of wind 
installations.181 The FIT also benefitted from relative stability and long 
investment periods.182 
 
 Problems, however, began as the overall cost of the FIT rose. 
To combat the rise in costs, starting with the EEG in 2000, Germany 
instituted a policy of rate degression. Degression is a FIT policy that 
decreases FITs rates by predetermined amounts.183 Reducing FITs 
rates helps them to reflect technology cost reductions.184 In addition, 
degression can be essential to contain overall policy cost as the number 
of facilities receiving the FITs premium increases in response to lower 
installation costs.185  
 
 
177 Christoph Böhringer, et al., The Impact of the German Feed-in Tariff 
Scheme on Innovation: Evidence Based on Patent Filings in Renewable Energy 
Technologies, 67 ENERGY ECON. 545, 545 (2017). 
178 Id.  
179 How Much Power Does a Nuclear Reactor Produce?, OFFICE OF 
NUCLEAR ENERGY (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/infographic-
how-much-power-does-nuclear-reactor-produce (For comparison, each nuclear 
power plant in the United States on average produces about 1 GW of electricity.).  
180 Meredith Fowlie, The Renewable Energy Auction Revolution, ENERGY 
INST. BLOG (Aug. 7, 2017), https://energyathaas.wordpress.com/2017/08/07/the-
renewable-energy-auction-revolution/.  
181 Lacerda, supra note 103, at 8246. 
182 Id. 
183 Couture, supra note 136, at 5; Tae-hyeong Kwon, Rent and Rent-
Seeking in Renewable Energy Support Policies: Feed-in Tariff vs. Renewable 
Portfolio Standard 44 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 676, 679-80 
(2015) [hereinafter Kwon, Rent] (Degression usually applies only to newly-
installed facilities.).   
184 Couture, supra note 136, at 9. 
185 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 65-66. 
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 As the costs of the EEG mounted, Germany instituted more 
aggressive degression policies. In 2009, it adopted a dynamic 
degression policy, which considered the quantity of the previous year’s 
installations when determining adjustments to the FITs rates.186 Two 
years later, to keep up with rapidly-declining costs, Germany began to 
adjust its solar PV FIT rates biannually.187 In 2013, as prices began to 
fall even faster, Germany began degressing its FIT rates monthly.188 
  
 At the same time, because of rising total solar subsidies, 
Germany capped the number of installations that could receive the 
FITs rate.189 Nevertheless, the subsidy that ratepayers needed to cover 
rose substantially. In 2000, the annual EEG subsidy was less than €1 
billion; by 2016, it had risen to €25 billion.. 190 Twenty three billion 
euros of this appeared as a surcharge on ratepayers’ bills, averaging 
€1,060 per household.191  
 
 A number of compounding factors caused this jump in the FITs 
surcharge. Prices for solar panels fell much faster than anticipated. 
This led to rapidly rising profit margins, which encouraged developers 
to install even more capacity.192 Degressing the subsidy more rapidly 
merely prompted developers to rush to install even more projects 
before rates fell further. Even though Germany eventually decided to 
degress rates monthly, the outstanding 20-year guaranteed contracts 
ensure that Germans will be paying the high FITs rates into the 
2030’s.193 Even after its reforms, Germany’s residents still pay among 
the highest electricity rates in Europe.194 
 
 In 2014, Germany approved a plan largely to replace its FITs 
with auctions as the primary means to secure new renewable energy 
 
186 Tanaka, supra note 121, at 6. 
187 Davies, supra note 120, at 957-58. 
188 Bentham Paulos, The Money Problem with Germany’s Renewable 
Energy Law in 3 Charts, GREEN TECH MEDIA (June 5, 2014), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-money-problem-with-the-
german-energiewende-in-3-charts.   
189 Davies, supra note 120, at 958. 
190 Böhringer, supra note 177, at 546. 
191 Jeffrey Ball, Germany's High-Priced Energy Revolution, FORTUNE 
(Mar. 14 2017, 6:30 AM), http://fortune.com/2017/03/14/germany-renewable-
clean-energy-solar/.  
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Suzuki, supra note 176. 
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contracts.195 Initially, auctions were compulsory only for ground-
mounted PV. Germany amended the EEG again in 2017 to expand the 
use of auctions for most renewable energy, except for small plants, 
prototypes, and geothermal energy.196 Contracts for renewable energy 
still included 20-year terms, but the price was determined through 
auction rather than by the FITs.197 Within two years, prices for solar 
PV dropped by almost 40%.198 Nevertheless, as of 2018, German 
consumers were still paying subsidies totaling €27 billion.199 
 
  2. Spain 
 
 In 1994, Spain adopted its FIT. The legislation, Royal Decree 
2366/1994, mandated purchases of electricity from designated 
technologies and set FIT rates of up to 20% above costs.200 Spain 
further incentivized solar energy in 2007, when it set the highest rate 
for PV in the world.201 Regarding overall renewable energy 
installations, these policies were quite successful. In 1990, less than 
1% of Spain’s electricity was sourced from renewables; by 2009, its 
share had grown to 25%, and, by 2013, to 54%.202  
 
 Unlike Germany, Spain did not allow its utility companies to 
pass on the premiums paid for renewable energy to their customers.203 
Instead, it required the utilities to maintain deferral accounts. These 
 
195Corinna Klessmann & Silvana Tiedemann, Germany’s First 
Renewables Auctions are a Success, but New Rules Are Upsetting the Market, 
ENERGY POST (June 27, 2017), http://energypost.eu/germanys-first-renewables-
auctions-are-a-success-but-new-rules-are-upsetting-the-market/; see also, Section 
III, infra subsec. C.3 (Auctions are discussed more fully.). 
196 Norton Rose Fulbright, German Renewable Energy Act 2017 (EEG 
2017) - What You Should Know (Apr. 2017), 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/147727/german-
renewable-energy-act-2017-eeg-2017-what-you-should-know. 
197 Id. 
198 Klessmann, supra note 195. 
199 Brian Parkin, German Renewable Subsidy Drops after Wholesale 
Power Rebound, BLOOMBERG ENV’T & ENERGY REP. (Oct. 15, 2018, 9:52 AM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/german-renewable-
subsidy-drops-after-wholesale-power-rebound. 
200 Davies, supra note 120, at 969. 
201 Id. at 975.  
202 Id. at 979. 
203 Institute of Energy Research [IER], Spain Halts Feed-In-Tariffs for 
Renewable Energy (Apr. 9, 2012), 
https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/renewable/wind/spain-halts-feed-in-
tariffs-for-renewable-energy/. 
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accounts enabled the utilities to recover shortfalls from previous years 
with subsequent years’ revenues.204 However, Spain kept utility prices 
paid by consumers low. As a result, not only were utilities unable to 
recoup previous shortfalls, the tariff deficit grew.205 The 2008 financial 
crisis compounded problems. Unemployment in Spain rose above 
20%, and electricity demand declined commensurately, resulting in 
excess generating capacity.206 Spain had hoped that the utilities could 
sell their tariff deficits as securitized debt, but this became impossible 
in these new economic conditions.207 This forced the Spanish 
government to bail out the utilities and provide backing for the tariff 
debt.208 The Spanish government effectively assumed this debt.209 By 
2013, accumulated debt had ballooned to €26 billion.210  
 
 Spain began introducing a series of measures to rein in its FIT. 
In 2012, it modified its compensation scheme, no longer basing it upon 
FITs rates, but instead assuring a “reasonable profitability” based upon 
a company’s assets.211 Critically, Spain applied its reforms 
retroactively. Consequently, older facilities that were constructed in 
anticipation of receiving FITs rates stopped receiving subsidies 
altogether.212  
 
 Not surprisingly, such retroactive changes prompted litigation, 
but, importantly, on two fronts. Domestic investors brought suits in 
Spanish courts, while international investors were able to pursue their 
claims in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (“ICSID”).213 The Spanish courts upheld the FITs cuts.214 
The international court, however, sided with the investors. Investors 
have filed 26 cases in the ICSID over Spain’s altering of its FITs 
 
204 Id. 
205 Davies, supra note 120, at 981. 
206 IER, supra note 203. 
207 Davies, supra note 120, at 981. 
208 IER, supra note 203. 
209 Davies, supra note 120, at 977. 
210 CARMEN OTERO GARCÍA-CASTRILLÓN, SPAIN AND INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION: THE RENEWABLE ENERGY EXPLOSION 5 (2016).  
211 Davies, supra note 120, at 978. 
212 Id. at 979. 
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contract.215 Spain has already lost several of these cases, with the 
judgments currently totaling in excess of $590 million.216 
 
 Although the Spanish FIT engendered substantial financial 
burdens, it did accomplish its purpose. Not only did renewable energy 
deployments take off under the FIT,217 the FIT established conditions 
that enabled continued renewable energy investment. Indeed, in the 
past three years, Spain has added 12 GW of solar power, an amount 
that exceeded its remaining 9 GW of coal.218 More notably, it started 
installing 5 GW of solar in 2018 despite the absence of subsidies.219 
 
  3. China 
 
 In 2006, China enacted the framework for its FIT, and, three 
years later, it established a specific FIT to support wind power.220 In 
2011, China enacted a series of FIT policies to further support solar 
PV.221 This accelerated investment in solar, with annual installations 
rising from less than 5 GW in 2011 to nearly 35 GW in 2016.222 
 
215 Blanca Díaz López, Spain Loses its First Renewable Energy Case in 
International Courts, PV MAG. (May 5, 2017), https://www.pv-
magazine.com/2017/05/05/spain-loses-its-first-renewable-energy-case-in-
international-courts/. 
216 9REN Holding S.a.r.l v. Kingdom of Spain, 2015 (No. ARB/15/15) 
(Spain), https://www.italaw.com/cases/7374 (Damages $46,958,243.); Eiser 
Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg S.à.r..l. v. Kingdom of 
Spain, 2013 (No. ARB/13/36) (Spain), https://www.italaw.com/cases/5721 
(Damages $140,757,760.); Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. Kingdom of 
Spain, May 16, 2018, (No. ARB/14/1) (Spain), https://www.italaw.com/cases/6608 
(Damages $75,644,310.); NextEra Energy Global Holdings B.V. and NextEra 
Energy Spain Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, May 31, 2019, (No. 
ARB/14/11) (Spain), https://www.italaw.com/cases/2585; (Damages 
$327,145,274.).  
217 Davies, supra note 120, at 979. 
218 Reed Landberg, Spain Says 5 Gigawatts of Subsidy-Free Solar Farms 
Being Built, BLOOMBERG ENV’T & ENERGY REP. (Oct.1, 2018, 11:21 AM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/spain-says-5-gigawatts-
of-subsidy-free-solar-farms-being-built. 
219 Id. 
220 CAROLIN SCHENUIT ET AL., MONEY WELL SPENT: THE ECONOMIES OF 
SUPPORT POLICIES FOR RENEWABLES 38 (2018), 
https://www.dena.de/fileadmin/dena/Publikationen/PDFs/2018/The_Economies_of
_support_for_renewables.pdf.  
221 Liang-Cheng Ye, João F.D. Rodrigues, & Hai Xiang Lin, Analysis of 
Feed-in Tariff Policies for Solar Photovoltaic in China 2011–2016, 203 APPLIED 
ENERGY 496, 496-97 (2017). 
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Initially, China’s program provided a premium payment for renewable 
sources, and the government paid the premium.223 Subsequently, in 
2009, it imposed a surcharge on retail electricity rates to finance the 
FIT.224  
 
 Despite the rapid rise in PV installations, China encountered 
some issues in the application of its FIT program. China and its FIT 
program are distinct from European countries and their policies in 
several ways. First, China is a much larger country, and its renewable 
energy resources are unevenly distributed and are most abundantly 
available in the north, northwest, and south.225 Conversely, the 
developed areas of the country are in central and eastern China.226 As 
discussed below, these disparities would create implications for 
China’s FIT structure. Second, unlike its contemporaries, the Chinese 
FIT did not impose an automatic degression. It did incorporate a 30-
month tariff adjustment period,227 but this contrasts greatly to 
Germany’s eventual adjustment period of one month.228 As in Europe, 
solar PV prices in China declined rapidly, leading to highly profitable 
FITs rates later in the period.229 The Chinese FIT policies did 
incentivize solar PV, but developers built a substantial portion of the 
facilities in the western portion of China. This area is rich in solar 
resources, but it was relatively undeveloped and lacked transmission 
lines to high-consumption provinces.230 Unused wind and solar 
capacity worsened after 2014.231 In different regions of China, wasted 
wind power reached 21% and unused solar neared 20%.232  
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 To address this problem, China regionalized its FIT system. 
Under this approach, installations in areas receiving higher levels of 
solar radiation earned lower tariffs.233 In addition, China also imposed 
caps on the amount of PV installations built in each region. 
Installations that exceeded the quota would not receive the region’s 
FIT rate.234 However, China does not utilize a hard cap. Instead, the 
central government sets the quotas, but it allows local governments to 
approve developments. Local governments, of course, are incentivized 
to approve projects to promote local economies. Consequently, they 
typically approved more projects than their quota targeted.235  
 
 As elsewhere, the Chinese FIT began to require substantial 
modification. Public support for the FIT began to wane, and tens of 
billions of yuan of FITs subsidies were not provided.236 By 2017, 
China’s deficit exceeded $16 billion.237 In 2017, China implemented a 
trial renewable portfolio standard (“RPS”) for wind power and solar 
PV.238 The RPS applies to 31 cities and provinces,239 though full 
implementation will not occur for at least five years.240  
 
 The experiences of these three countries illustrate the success 
that FITs have had in promoting renewable energy; they also provide 
cautionary tales about potential problems that might arise. Consistent 
with the S curve pattern, slow technological development was 
followed by explosive growth. Although the cost of renewable energy 
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Chinese government’s initial draft proposal planned to impose a Spain-like 
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dropped dramatically, the long-term commitment that fostered that 
growth became so burdensome that it necessitated policy changes, 
including the elimination of the FIT. 
 
 C. Feed-In Tariffs – Long Term Effects  
 
  1. Problems  
 
 Despite the profound success of FITs, or possibly because of 
it, countries utilizing them have eventually encountered difficulties. 
Nations who have successfully employed FITs to incentivize 
renewable energy installation during the early adoption stage have 
often needed to restrict or abandon these policies as the technologies 
advance through the take-off stage. A review of these developments 
suggests that the dynamics of the S curve provide especially important 
insights for the utilization and modification of FITs policies. 
 
 As noted, FITs have contributed substantially to the growth of 
renewable energy throughout the globe.241 The experiences of 
Germany and Spain have demonstrated, however, the long-run effects 
of FITs can be problematic. FITs create market distortions that, as the 
targeted technologies begin to take off, require modification of the 
FITs or transition to alternative policies.242 
 
 Although FITs are very effective in their short- and 
intermediate-term impacts on new technologies, a number of concerns 
will typically arise over their long-term implementation.243 Long-run 
utilization of FITs can cause fiscal burdens, market distortions, and 
decreased innovation.244 Indeed, FITs caused heavy financial burdens 
throughout the globe.245 An aspect of FITs that constitutes one of their 
strengths – their contract requirements – inevitably leads to these 
problems. FITs typically require 15-20 year contracts set at premium 
levels.246 A problem inherent with FITs, however, is that governments 
establish the tariff levels, while the costs of the technologies result 
 
241 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 5. 
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from market forces.247 Cost declines are one of the expected benefits 
of FITs.248 For example, wind power price reductions resulted from a 
number of factors triggered by FITs, including economies of scale, 
technological improvements, and learning by doing.249 Nevertheless, 
FITs mandate the purchase of electricity at premium rates potentially 
decades into the future. Consequently, declines in technology costs 
stimulate booms in installations to take advantage of the resulting 
profit margins, thereby triggering excessive subsidy burdens.250  
 
 These FIT surcharges, reflecting decades-long commitments, 
must be passed on either to ratepayers or to taxpayers.251 Such 
surcharges plagued the FITs utilized by Germany and Spain, 
respectively.252 Consequently, both nations, whose FITs were models 
for other countries, abandoned their FITs.253 The inevitability of such 
problems was noted by Professors Davies and Allen, who wrote, “the 
paradox inherent in feed-in tariffs is that they are designed to gradually 
self-destruct.”254 While a substantial and growing surcharge is usually 
inevitable (assuming FITs accomplish their intended purpose of 
reducing costs and thereby stimulating installations). As discussed 
below, jurisdictions can design FITs to compensate for these 
developments.  
 
Interestingly, in 2012 South Korea replaced its FIT with an 
RPS.255 South Korea instituted this change for several reasons. The 
 
247 SCHENUIT, supra note 242, at 39; see also Nolden, supra note 79, at 6 
(Indeed, critics have pointed to the reliance of FITs upon governments instead of 
markets to set tariff levels as one of the policy’s greatest shortcomings.). 
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cost curve demonstrates increasing returns to scale. This pattern was apparent both 
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country paid its FIT subsidies through its national budget.256 
Consequently, South Korea regularly confronted budget overruns 
caused by its FIT.257 Particularly problematic was a rapid increase in 
subsidies for solar photovoltaic.258 While the FIT was successful in 
incentivizing a number of suppliers to install solar, this imposed 
significant costs.259 Moreover, despite its success with solar, overall 
the FIT underperformed. Specifically, South Korea sought to raise 
renewable energy’s share of total electricity to 8%, but it reached only 
3%.260 Accordingly, the country switched to an RPS in part to impose 
a more results-oriented policy.261 The move worked, as renewable 
energy installations increased three fold during the succeeding five 
years when compared to the previous decade’s deployment under the 
FIT.262  
 
 Besides their well-documented financial burdens, FITs suffer 
from another concern: their continued promotion of technological 
innovation is limited. If set too high, subsidy policies, such as FITs, 
can encourage deployment of expensive and inefficient technologies, 
locking-in these methods and failing to incentivize less mature 
technologies.263 Moreover, since high-cost technologies receive 
profitable returns on investments, FITs remove a primary incentive to 
innovate and reduce costs.264 Eliminating – or at least reducing – 
subsidies, such as FITs, forces industry to lower costs.265 Because of 
the cost-plus-profit structure used by most FITs, they encourage 
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exploitative behavior (increasing production of existing technologies) 
over inventive activities (investing in research and development to 
increase efficiencies and reduce costs).266  
 
  2. Making FITs Work 
 
 To avoid the financial burdens inevitable with FITs, policy 
makers can incorporate provisions to minimize or avoid their effects. 
Because of the market changes FITs produce, FITs policies inevitably 
need to be adjusted over time.267 Such adjustments need to be 
proactive.268 If not adjusted timely, the disparity between technology 
costs and tariffs fosters “rent-seeking”269 behavior, sparking a rise in 
the number of installations as the FITs subsidy increases.270  
 
 FITs can avoid or at least minimize these consequences either 
by anticipating changes or adjusting their tariffs as conditions change. 
At the time that FITs are established, policy makers can select from a 
range of options to adjust the FITs subsidy, ranging from systems that 
are fully automatic to methods that require regulator 
decisionmaking.271 Policy makers can anticipate market changes by 
structuring planned degressions in their FITs tariffs by basing them on 
the number of installations or overall cost.272 Often, such policies 
 
266 Böhringer, supra note 177, at 552. 
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no changes to its FITs rates. This led to a significant rise in the number of PV 
installations, prompting a commensurate rise in the financial burden of the Italian 
FIT.); V. Di Dio, S. Favuzza et al., Critical Assessment of Support for the 
Evolution of Photovoltaics and Feed-in Tariff(s) in Italy, 9 SUSTAINABLE ENERGY 
TECH. & ASSESSMENTS 95, 95 (2015) (The FIT charge constituted 18% of the 
average household’s bill, for an annual total exceeding €10 billion.). 
268 Davies, supra note 120, at 1004. 
269 Kwon, Rent-Seeking, supra note 183, at 678 (“Rents” in this context 
are windfall profits.); VIVID ECONOMICS, ADVANCE MARKET COMMITMENTS FOR 
LOW-CARBON DEVELOPMENT: AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 48 (2009) (They arise 
when the same price is paid for a good with a declining cost of production.).    
270 KWON, RENEWABLE, supra note 257, at 6. 
271 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 65-66. 
272 Mormann, supra note 132, at 1662, n.231 (Professor Mormann notes, 
for instance, that Germany’s FIT incorporated standard degressions that anticipated 
cost reductions, while California’s FIT automatically adjusted its FIT rates lower 
(or higher) if technology deployments exceeded (or failed to meet) expectations.); 
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utilize predetermined triggers to initiate automatic adjustments. 
Typical triggers include the passage of a specified period of time, the 
achievement of specific capacity or generation levels, or total policy 
costs.273 Alternatively, policy makers can design their FITs to require 
regulators to evaluate market conditions periodically and to adjust their 
tariffs accordingly.274   
 
 Because FITs control price rather than quantity,275 the amount 
of actual installations under a FIT is often difficult to forecast.276 Thus, 
when the FITs subsidies effectively increase because costs have 
declined while the tariff has remained flat, adjustment mechanisms 
help to control the volume of projects eligible for the tariff.277 
Unfortunately, these approaches implicate a tension inherent in FITs 
between maintaining price stability and adjusting tariffs to compensate 
for changing circumstances.278 Injecting uncertainty through price 
adjustments for as little as a few years into the future can increase the 
perceived riskiness for financiers.279 Policy stability and transparency 
better supports investors’ security.280 The detrimental effect of tariff 
adjustments can be minimized by increasing the transparency of the 
process – such as setting predetermined periods for adjustments or 
tying adjustments to levels of deployment.281  
 
 
Pablo del Rıo & Mercedes Bleda, Comparing the Innovation Effects of Support 
Schemes for Renewable Electricity Technologies: A Function of Innovation 
Approach, 50 ENERGY POL’Y 272, 277 (2012) (An added advantage of degressions 
is that they provide incentives to innovate to reduce costs and maintain profit 
margins. Indeed, evidence indicates that Germany’s degression stimulated R&D 
investments.). 
273 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 66. 
274 Couture, supra note 136, at 5 (For example, Spain chose to adjust its 
FITs rates annually.).  
275 Nurcan Kilinc-Ata, The Evaluation of Renewable Energy Policies 
Across EU Countries and US States: An Econometric Approach, 31 ENERGY FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. 83, 84 (2016). 
276 Nigel Martin & John Rice, Solar Feed-In Tariffs: Examining Fair And 
Reasonable Retail Rates Using Cost Avoidance Estimates, 112 ENERGY POL’Y 19. 
(2018). 
277 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 69. 
278 Stokes, supra note 131, at 490. 
279 Cory, supra note 126, at 12. 
280 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 60. 
281 IEA, supra note 61, at 81;. UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124 at 
69 (Of course, including adjustments with triggers or market reviews requires 
additional administrative infrastructure to support these policy shifts.).  
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 Thus, some adjustments are available within the FITs system. 
Nevertheless, most nations chose to replace their FITs partially or 
wholly with other policies. 
 
  3. Transitioning to Auctions 
 
 To minimize the financial impacts of FITs, jurisdictions have 
turned to another mechanism – tenders. As renewable energy 
technologies have matured, their costs no longer impede investment. 
Consequently, the FITs subsidy becomes unnecessary to encourage 
deployment of these technologies.282 Furthermore, perpetuating FIT 
subsidies during a technology’s take-off stage increases their financial 
burden substantially.283 Accordingly, a number of countries have 
turned to a process first used decades before to secure renewable 
energy contracts – tenders.284 Tenders (also called “competitive 
bidding,”285 “reverse auctions,”286 or just “auctions”287) enable 
governments to control the costs of renewable energy deployment. 
Governments determine the amount of capacity to be built, open the 
contracts for these installations to bidders, and then contract with a low 
bidder, who agrees to build the identified capacity.288 Some tenders 
award the contract to the lowest bidder, while others may use multiple 
criteria to select winners.289 Governments have sought fulfillment by 
specific technologies or groups of technologies, or they have been 
technology neutral.290  
 
 
282 Herman K. Trabish, RIP FITs: As US Feed-in Tariffs Fade, Adopting 
Elements could Spur Solar Growth, UTILITY DIVE (July 18, 2016), 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/rip-fits-as-us-feed-in-tariffs-fade-adopting-
elements-could-spur-solar-gr/422727/.  
283 SCHENUIT, supra note 220, at 39. 
284 Fell, supra note 114, at 3 (In the 1990’s under its Non Fossil Fuel 
Obligation (“NFFO”), the United Kingdom accepted bids for electricity generation 
from non-fossil fuel sources, including renewable energy.). 
285 REN21, supra note 123, at 122-23. 
286 Kilinc-Ata, supra note 275, at 84. 
287 REN21, supra note 123, at 122-23. 
288 Kilinc-Ata, supra note 275, at 84; SCHENUIT, supra note 220, at 16 
(Tenders may include ceiling prices to signal the maximum rate that will be 
accepted, thereby assuring policy costs.).  
289 SCHENUIT, supra note 220, at 9, 18 (Additional criteria typically 
involve factors such as local industrial development, project lead time, or 
geographic distribution of installations.).  
290 Malte Gephart, Corinna Klessmann & Fabian Wigand, Renewable 
Energy– When are they (Cost-)Effective?, 28 ENERGY & ENV’T 145, 148 (2017). 
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 The use of tenders to source renewable energy has increased 
significantly. Nations both in Europe and Asia have utilized tenders in 
recent years. A number of European nations, including many 
renewable energy leaders, have turned to tenders. In 2015, Germany, 
the country that developed one of the model FITs, replaced its tariff 
program with auctions.291 France, Denmark and the Netherlands, 
among many others, are now using tenders as a primary means to add 
renewables.292 Some of the largest tenders, however, occurred in Asian 
countries, including China and India; Japan also has scheduled its own 
tenders.293 Overall, the number of countries using auctions has grown 
from 6 in 2005 to 67 in 2016.294  
 
 Not only do tenders avoid the burden of FITs subsidies, they 
can reduce renewable energy costs. Tenders, by their nature, 
encourage price competition.295 In a typical tender system, developers 
bid to sell electricity they will generate from a specified technology.296 
Thus, a primary function of tenders is to establish prices for electricity 
generated from particular technologies and to award contracts.297 One 
of the key advantages of tenders is that they determine prices through 
competitive price discovery rather than by administrative 
determination.298 Tenders, accordingly, are not truly support 
instruments, but instead they constitute a design element that can work 
with support mechanisms (such as a FIT or grid-connection 
 
291 REN21, supra note 123, at 122. 
292 Id. at 122-23 (Tenders currently constitute the fastest-growing form of 
renewable energy procurement in the United Kingdom.).  
293 Id. at 123.  
294 INTERNATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY [IRENA], RENEWABLE 
ENERGY AUCTIONS: ANALYSING 2016 8, 16 (2017); UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra 
note 124, at 12 (Typically, countries schedule tenders periodically.).   
295 TOBY D. COUTURE ET AL., THE NEXT GENERATION OF RENEWABLE 
ELECTRICITY POLICY: HOW RAPID CHANGE IS BREAKING DOWN CONVENTIONAL 
POLICY CATEGORIES, 5 (2015).  
296 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 12. 
297 COUTURE, supra note 295, at 12; SCHENUIT, supra note 220 at 11 
(Another value of tenders is that they provide governments with a better ability to 
control the installation of renewable energy and the particular mix of resources 
installed.).   
298 IEA, supra note 61, at 132; SCHENUIT, supra note 220 at 11 (By 
determining prices through direct competition, tenders help avoid the windfall 
profits, or rents, possible when prices fall faster than tariffs adjust.); IRENA, supra 
note 294, at 17 (This price discovery process also not only informs the current 
price, but also the historic trend informs future auction prices.).  
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policies).299 Besides assisting with price discovery, another benefit of 
tenders is that they reduce procurement costs.300 By forcing developers 
to bid for the opportunity to sell electricity into the grid, tenders 
incentivize developers to reduce costs to secure contracts for their 
projects.301 
 
 Despite the popularity of tenders, critics have raised several 
concerns about their use. A primary concern is that tenders limit the 
volume of new installations.302 This in part results from the contrasting 
 
299 SCHENUIT, supra note 220, at 9; Oscar Fitch-Roy, David Benson & 
Bridget Woodman, Policy Instrument Supply and Demand: How the Renewable 
Electricity Auction Took over the World, 7 POL. & GOVERNANCE 81, 82 (2019) 
(Jurisdictions utilize tenders in a number of different capacities relative to FITs. In 
many instances, tenders replace their FITs.);  Paolo Cozzi, ASSESSING REVERSE 
AUCTIONS AS A POLICY TOOL FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY DEPLOYMENT 30 (2012), 
https://sites.tufts.edu/cierp/files/2018/02/May12CozziReverseAuctions.pdf (In 
others, they merely supplement FITs policies.);  REN21, supra note 123, at 132 (In 
some instances, countries use tenders side-by-side with FITs, typically awarding 
contracts for larger contracts through tenders while using FITs to support smaller 
projects (and, typically, smaller developers).).  
300 Fowlie, supra note 180. 
301 Brian Parkin, Germany Pits Solar Against Wind for First Time in 
Power Auction, BLOOMBERG ENV’T & ENERGY REP. (Feb. 21, 2018)., 11:41 AM), 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X7R3STGO000000?bna_news_filter=e
nvironment-and-
energy&jcsearch=BNA%252000000161b918d846a17fb9da38360000#jcite. 
302 Fell, supra note 114, at 1; Jan Kreiss, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, & Marie-
Christin Haufe, Appropriate Design of Auctions for Renewable Energy Support – 
Prequalifications and Penalties, vol.101 ENERGY POL’Y, 512, 512 (2017) (stating, 
actually, that “tenders massively curb the expansion rates of renewable energies”) 
(An initial concern regarding the replacement of FITs with tenders was the latter’s 
realization rates. Low realization rates – awarded bidders failing to generate the 
amount of electricity contracted – characterized tenders.) (This results from bidders 
submitting low bids that do not cover project costs.); Gephart, supra note 290, at 
151. (For example, early tenders suffered from realization rates below 40% (38% 
under the UK’s NFFO program from 1990 to 1998, 30% for a geothermal auction 
by The Netherlands’ in 2011, and 30% for an onshore wind auction in Brazil in 
2009-10).); Kreiss, supra note 302, at 512, 512-13 (The low realization rates have 
had different causes. For instance, in the United Kingdom, tenders utilized low 
financial prequalification standards; in Brazil, conversely, the unavailability of grid 
connections rendered timely satisfaction of realization requirements impossible.); 
Kreiss, supra note 302, at 512-23 (Governments can avoid the problem of low 
realization rates, however, by imposing prequalification requirements or penalties.) 
(Prequalification requirements may include satisfaction of general criteria (such as 
experience, technical ability, or financial strength) or fulfillment of project-specific 
actions (such as submission of a land-use plan or a feasibility study)); Sandra 
Enkhardt, Germany Reports High Realization Rate for PV Projects Selected in 
Auctions, PV MAG. (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.pv-
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natures of tenders and the mechanism often preceding them, FITs. A 
critical benefit of FITs is that any investor in a qualifying project is 
assured of receiving the tariff for generated electricity.303 Conversely, 
tenders award contracts only to those projects necessary to achieve a 
particular installation or budget goal.304 Indeed, several nations have 
turned to tenders to slow down the installation of renewable energy 
resources. Countries with mature solar markets, for instance, have used 
tenders to address subsidy budget deficits, market saturation, and grid 
management concerns.305  
 
 A critical distinction of tenders from FITs is that tender 
systems reduce investor certainty. Since tenders cannot assure 
investors of securing contracts unless they submit a winning bid, 
tenders inject uncertainty into the development phase of a project.306 
Not only do tenders instill doubt, they also impose new administrative 
costs in the form of bid preparation.307 This can be especially 
problematic for smaller developers.308 Finally, tenders tend to favor a 
few, dominant players over smaller participants. Several 
characteristics of tenders – including administrative and financial 
requirements – discourage engagement by small actors.309  
 
 Nevertheless, a number of countries have begun using tenders 
to secure renewable energy production. France was one of the first 
countries to do so. In 2001, it applied FITs to projects under 12 MW 
 
magazine.com/2018/01/09/germany-reports-high-realization-rate-for-pv-projects-
selected-in-auctions/ (Penalties can include lower levels of financial support, a 
shortened support period, termination of the contract, or exclusion from future 
auctions.); Kreiss, supra note 302, at 513 (Accordingly, more recent realization 
rates have exceeded 90%.).   
303 Schmalensee, supra note 137, at 50.  
304 IRENA, supra note 294, at 17.  
305 Sonal Patel, More Countries Banking on Competitive Auctions over 
Subsidies to Stimulate Renewables, POWER MAG. (Jan. 3, 2018), 
https://www.powermag.com/more-countries-banking-on-competitive-auctions-
over-subsidies-to-stimulate-renewables/.  
306 IEA, Deploying Renewables, supra note 61, at 132. 
307 SCHENUIT, supra note 220, at 11. 
308 Id. 
309 Fell, supra note 114, at 9, 18 (On the other hand, Fell acknowledges 
that tenders can be helpful in procuring investments from large investors for more 
sizeable projects that help reduce costs.).  
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and tenders to larger projects.310 Ten years later, France extended its 
tender program to smaller projects and broadened it to cover rooftop 
solar.311 Both FITs and tenders were successful. In fact, as of 2014, 
38% of the country’s solar PV capacity resulted from its FIT while the 
remaining 62% derived from tenders.312  
 
 Another country now relying upon tenders is Germany. As 
previously discussed, in response to high electricity costs, Germany 
abandoned its FIT.313 In its place, Germany instituted tenders for 
renewable energy procurement.314 It started with auctions for solar 
power in 2015.315 Germany then added tenders for onshore wind, 
offshore wind, and biomass.316 In the eleven solar auctions Germany 
has conducted since 2015, tender prices fell steadily from 9.17 
cents/kWh to 4.59 cents/kWh in less than three years.317 Furthermore, 
the realization rate of the first four tenders (for which contract 
completion data is available) ranged between 90% and 99.9%.318 The 
tenders have seen such successes that Germany’s parliament approved 
legislation to expand the country’s use of auctions. In fact, the 
parliament expects renewable energy’s share of Germany’s electricity 
production to rise from 38% to 65% by 2030.319 Furthermore, tenders 
have achieved their intended goal of controlling renewable energy 
costs. After the adoption of tenders, renewable energy prices fell to 
levels comparable to those of fossil fuel sources.320  
 
 
310 COUTURE, supra note 295, at 5, 8 (Advantages of this “layered” 
approach include enabling better control over market segment development and 
ensuring growth of multiple project size categories.).   
311 Id.  
312 Id. at 10.  
313 Fowlie, supra note 180. 
314 Id.  
315 SCHENUIT, supra note 220, at 24. 
316 Klessmann, supra note 195. 
317 SCHENUIT, supra note 220, at 24. 
318 Id.  
319 Brian Parkin, German Wind, Solar Tenders Expand as Sights Set on 
Coal’s Exit, BLOOMBERG ENV’T & ENERGY REP. (Nov. 30, 2018, 12:55 PM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/german-wind-solar-
tenders-expand-as-sights-set-on-coals-exit. 
320 Vaishnavi Chandrashekhar, As Subsidies Wane, Market Forces Drive 
the Growth of Renewables, GREEN BIZ (July 16, 2018), 
https://www.greenbiz.com/article/subsidies-wane-market-forces-drive-growth-
renewables.  
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 Following this lead, other countries have adopted tenders as 
well. The two largest developing countries, China and India, have 
decided to use tenders to secure future renewable energy installations. 
In 2018, China announced that it would end its FIT for utility-scale 
projects and require the use of tenders to set their prices.321 India also 
has turned to tenders to increase its renewable energy installations. 
Specifically, it will use tenders to secure 500 GW of renewable energy 
generation capacity by 2028.322  
 
 Several jurisdictions and utilities in the United States have 
begun turning to tenders, too. Since 2010, California has enabled 
investor-owned utilities to use tenders to procure RPS-eligible 
renewable energy production from small producers.323 In addition, the 
PJM Interconnection324 and utilities in Arizona, Massachusetts, and 
Nevada, have all recently enacted tenders.325  
 
 Tenders have helped to lower the costs of renewable energy 
installations. They have established lower prices for solar PV, onshore 
wind, and offshore wind.326 For projects coming online by 2023, costs 
 
321 Emma Foehringer Merchant, China’s Bombshell Solar Policy Shift 
Could Cut Expected Capacity by 20 Gigawatts, GREENTECH MEDIA (June 6, 2018), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/chinas-bombshell-solar-policy-
could-cut-capacity-20-gigawatts#gs.pfkhc6; SCHENUIT, supra note 220, at 40 
(China first implemented a tender in 2003, six years before it established its FIT. A 
wide variance in bid prices, however, reflected the industry’s still immature state.).  
322 Renewables Continue To Add Capacity Despite Glut, ENERGY NEWS 
MONITOR (May 13, 2019), https://www.orfonline.org/research/energy-news-
monitor-volume-xv-issue-48-50758/; Gephart, Klessmann & Wigand, supra note 
290, at 155 (Brazil, another developing country, has also turned to tenders for new 
wind installations, setting contract prices that represent a 60% reduction from its 
FITs rates.). 
323 Renewable Auction Mechanism, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N (2020), 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/renewable_auction_mechanism/. 
324 Who We Are, PJM (1999-2020) https://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-
we-are.aspx PJM (Interconnection is a regional transmission organization that 
coordinates wholesale electricity transactions in all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia and the District of Columbia.).  
325 SCHENUIT, supra note 220, at 27. 
326 IEA, Have the Prices from Competitive Auctions become the "New 
Normal" Prices for Renewables? (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.iea.org/articles/have-
the-prices-from-competitive-auctions-become-the-new-normal-prices-for-
renewables [hereinafter IEA, Prices] 
https://www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2019/february/have-the-prices-from-
competitive-auctions-become-the-new-normal-prices-for-.html. 
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range from 45% to 67% lower.327 Thus, tenders have provided a means 
to contain costs in the take-off stage after FITs have successfully 
promoted these technologies.  
 
 D. Renewable Portfolio Standards  
 
  1. A Brief Review 
 
 RPSs have also played a prominent role in incentivizing 
renewable energy deployment. A quick review of RPSs follows to 
enable a comparison to FITs, leading to a proposal to incorporate 
aspects of both policies to accelerate CDR development.328 
 
 RPSs implement a different approach from that used by FITs, 
and they have unique strengths and weaknesses. RPSs mandate that 
electricity producers must generate or purchase pre-established 
minimum percentages of their power from designated (usually 
renewable) sources.329 The generation of electricity from such sources 
is recognized through the provision of renewable energy credits 
(“RECs”).330 RPSs then utilize markets to set prices for renewable 
energy by allowing trading of these RECs.331 The trading of RECs in 
a market fosters price competition.332 RPSs have been popular and 
successful in incentivizing renewable energy development. While 
RPSs are not as widespread as FITs, as of 2017, at least 67 countries 
had set RPS-like targets for renewable capacity or generation.333  
 
 
327 Id.; IRENA, supra note 294, at 21 (A number of factors, however, 
determine the prices established by the auctions and their eventual success in 
securing the electricity sought. These include any land acquisition costs, resource 
quality, and project size.).  
328 Anthony E. Chavez, Using Renewable Portfolio Standards to 
Accelerate Development of Negative Emissions Technologies, 43 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (2018) (For a more complete discussion of RPSs).  
329 Ryan Wiser, Galen Barbose, & Edward Holt, Supporting Solar Power 
in Renewables Portfolio Standards: Experience from the United States, 39 ENERGY 
POL’Y 3894, 3894 (2011). 
330 Mormann, supra note 132, at 1663. 
331 Id. 
332 Abolhosseini, supra note 161, at 881. 
333 Jenny Heeter, Bethany Speer, & Mark B. Glick, INT’L BEST PRAC. FOR 
IMPLEMENTING & DESIGNING RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD POLICIES 1 
(2019). 
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 A major distinction between FITs and RPSs involves the 
certainty for developers of their return on investment.334 FITs, of 
course, guarantee the purchase of electricity generated by qualified 
sources.335 Power producers in RPS jurisdictions, however, submit 
proposals through competitive solicitations.336 A competitive 
solicitation can impose significant burdens on applicants, such as the 
costs of developing the proposal, the risks of failing to secure the bid, 
and more complicated financing arrangements (since the return on 
investment is not assured).337 Thus, RPSs not only shift risk to 
investors, they also raise investors’ transaction costs.338 
 
 While basic RPSs do not incentivize specific technologies, 
policy makers can add certain provisions – called multipliers and carve 
outs – to enable RPSs to promote particular technologies. Carve outs 
identify minimum levels of electricity to be produced from a particular 
type of source. These targets are “carved out” of the overall renewable 
energy percentage for the jurisdiction’s electricity.339 Conversely, 
multipliers allow the generation of electricity by particular energy 
sources to earn multiples of credits as compared to electricity produced 
by other identified sources.340 For instance, seven states use multipliers 
for solar, with multipliers of credits ranging from two to three times 
the standard one credit for each megawatt of generation by other 
renewable energy sources.341 One benefit that both carve outs and 
multipliers share is that jurisdictions can apply these devices to several 
technologies at the same time, thereby supporting multiple 
undeveloped methods. Delaware, for instance, uses multipliers for fuel 
cells, solar, and offshore wind.342 New Mexico, on the other hand, 
 
334 Kang, supra note 127, at 28. 
335 Mormann, supra note 132, at 1631-32. 
336 Couture, supra note 136, at 22.  
337 Cory, supra note 126, at 9. 
338 Mormann, supra note 132, at 1664. 
339 EPA, ENERGY & ENVRIONMENT GUIDE TO ACTION 5 [hereinafter EPA 
ENERGY & ENVRIONMENT GUIDE]. 
340 Greg Buckman, The Effectiveness of Renewable Portfolio Standard 
Banding and Carve-Outs in Supporting High-Cost Types of Renewable Electricity, 
39 ENERGY POL’Y 4105, 4105 (2011); Id. (Multipliers are also identified as 
banding.).  
341 EPA ENERGY & ENVRIONMENT GUIDE, supra note 339, at 5.  
342 Miriam Fischlein & Timothy M. Smith, Revisiting Renewable Portfolio 
Standard Effectiveness: Policy Design and Outcome Specification Matter, 46 
POL’Y SCI 277, 290 (2013).  
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carves out minimum percentages of its RPS goals for solar, wind, and 
“other renewables.”343  
 
  2. Differences between FITs and RPSs  
 
 At a fundamental level, the two systems differ in the focus of 
their approaches. FITs are price-based policies, whereas RPSs are 
quantity based.344 Under FITs, regulators determine the price for 
power from particular sources, and the market determines the quantity 
to be installed.345 Conversely, regulators under RPSs set the quantity 
of electricity to be sourced from designated technologies, and the 
market establishes the price.346  
 
 The different structure of these policies alters the allocation of 
risks. RPSs, which rely on competitive solicitations, shift more risk to 
investors.347 By requiring particular quantities of renewable energy at 
whatever price providers can acquire it, RPSs incentivize cost 
reduction, while the risk of project acceptance and pricing falls on 
investors.348 FITs facilitate the development of new technologies by 
requiring investors to assume only a minimal level of risk.349 The 
guaranteed contract of FITs enables developers to avoid competitive 
solicitations. Also, they can secure financing for larger proportions of 
their projects, which helps lower the cost of financing.350 Not only do 
FITs assure profitability, they also provide predictable returns.351 
 
 Because of the structural differences between FITs and RPSs, 
these policies tend to be most effective in incentivizing different types 
of investors and technologies. Quantity-based policies, such as RPSs, 
are better suited to more mature technologies.352 In addition, because 
of the uncertainty of return on investment with the competitive 
solicitation method used with RPSs, larger investors are better able to 
 
343 Id. at 287. 
344 Kilinc-Ata, supra note 275, at 84. 
345 Kwon, Rent, supra note 183, at 677. 
346 Id. 
347 Cory, supra note 126, at 9. 
348 Kwon, Rent, supra note 183, at 677. 
349 Abolhosseini, supra note 161, at 884. 
350 Cory, supra note 126, at 9. 
351 Zhang,  supra note 236, at 427. 
352Francesco Nicolli & Francesco Vona, Heterogeneous Policies, 
Heterogeneous Technologies: the Case of Renewable Energy, 56 ENERGY ECON. 
190, 190 (2016). 
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weather the costs and risks associated with starting projects.353 RPSs 
also tend to favor projects with long-term targets (10-15 years) for 
profitability.354 This also incentivizes more mature technologies, 
which are closer to competitiveness.355 Because RPSs set quantity 
requirements and allow others to choose the technology with which to 
satisfy the mandate, they encourage lower-cost technologies,356 which 
also tends to incentivize cost-reducing innovation.357 
 
 Conversely, guaranteed-price policies, such as FITs, tend to 
facilitate the development of technologies in their initial phases.358 
FITs also insulate covered technologies from competition with other 
technologies. Thus, they are especially effective at supporting new 
technologies that are not yet competitive.359  
 
 The risk shifting of these two policies also impacts regulators. 
The reduced risk encountered by investors with FITs does not 
disappear. Instead, FITs shift risk from investors to regulators.360 In 
FITs systems, regulators must set the FITs rates. If regulators set the 
rates too high, the number of investors and projects will increase, but 
the overall policy costs will rise. If the rates are too low, market 
expansion will be constrained, since only the most efficient projects 
will be viable.361 The precision of these rates is essential because 
excess premiums would eventually burden ratepayers or taxpayers.362  
 
 
353 IEA, Deploying Renewables, supra note 81, at 132. 
354 Kang, supra note 127, at 27. 
355 IEA, supra note 61, at 132. 
356 Ryan Wiser, Galen Barbose, & Edward Holt, Supporting Solar Power 
in Renewables Portfolio Standards: Experience from the United States, 39 ENERGY 
POL’Y 3894, 3896 (2011).  
357 Nathaniel Horner, Iñes Azevedo & David Hounshell, Effects of 
Government Incentives on Wind Innovation in the United States, 8 ENVTL. RES. 
LETTERS 6 (2013). 
358 Nicolli, supra note 352, at 190. 
359 IEA, Deploying Renewables, supra note 61, at 132;. Zhang, supra note 
236, at 433 (For this reason, China has plans to utilize a mix of RPS and FIT 
policies - the former to incentivize the more established source of wind power and 
the latter to promote the less competitive technologies, such as solar photovoltaic.); 
see also Section IV, infra subsec. B.   
360 Mormann, supra note 132, at 1660. 
361 Alizamir, supra note 88, at 53. 
362 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 7. 
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 Because FITs limit the risks to investors, they have been the 
more popular policy.363 In general, studies have found that FITs have 
more effectively promoted renewable energy development than any 
other policy.364 Because of this difference, a study of 35 countries 
concluded that FITs mitigate investor risks and encourage up to four 
times the amount of renewable energy deployment as that incentivized 
by RPSs.365  
 
 Thus, each policy has its own strengths. RPSs support a 
managed growth of technologies and encourage innovation and cost 
reduction. FITs, however, have proven to be more robust promoters of 
new technologies. 
 
 E. Tax Credits and Cash Grants 
 
 While FITs and RPSs were the primary drivers of renewable 
energy deployment, other policies played significant roles. In the 
United States, tax credits and cash grants were particularly 
supportive.366 Two types of tax credits have been used, one based on 
actual electricity generation and the other on the amount of investment 
in new technologies. 
 
 The United States enacted a production tax credit (“PTC”) that 
became a primary driver of wind energy.367 Congress established the 
wind PTC in the Energy Policy Act of 1992. As originally enacted, the 
PTC provided a tax credit for the first ten years of operation of a wind 
turbine.368 It provided a credit based upon the amount of annual 
electricity production from the turbine.369 Thus, a primary benefit of 
 
363 Schmalensee, supra note 137, at 60. 
364 Barry, supra note 169. 
365 Mormann, supra note 132, at 1660; IEA, Deploying Renewables, supra 
note 61, at 115 (However, analysis suggests this may result more from a greater 
adoption of FITs policies than from a greater effectiveness of that approach.).  
366 Felix Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits: Smarter Tax Policy for a 
Cleaner, More Democratic Energy Future (Beyond Tax Credits), 31 YALE J. ON 
REG. 303, 311 (2014) (Accelerated depreciation provisions also applied to 
renewable energy investments, but tax credits played a more significant role in 
renewable energy development.).  
367 Ferrey, supra note 171, at 354. 
368 Id.  
369 Alexandra B. Klass, Tax Benefits, Property Rights, and Mandates: 
Considering the Future of Government Support for Renewable Energy, 20 J. 
ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 19, 37 (2013); MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RSCH. 
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the PTC is that it subsidizes the specific activity – electricity 
generation by wind turbines – Congress sought to encourage.370  
 
 Numerous studies have found that the PTC successfully 
encouraged wind power installations.371 Researchers have found that 
the wind PTC has had a consistently positive and highly significant 
effect on wind technology deployment.372 Furthermore, the PTC 
enhances the effectiveness of other supportive policies, most 
noticeably RPSs.373  
 
 One limitation inherent with the PTC is that, as a credit against 
taxes, it requires tax liability to provide value.374 Because of the 
upfront costs involved with wind installations, however, developers do 
not typically produce profits (and the resulting tax liabilities) until after 
10 years or more of operations.375 Thus, to benefit from the PTC, many 
developers needed to use tax equity financing to monetize their tax 
benefits sooner.376 This process reduced the effective amount of 
financial support provided directly to the targeted activity, renewable 
energy production.377  
 
 Despite the PTC’s success in growing the wind industry, 
uncertainty concerning its availability negatively impacted its 
effectiveness.378 Congress repeatedly enacted the PTC for only a 
limited period of time and often let the credit expire before renewing 
it. Since the PTC’s first enactment in 1992, Congress has needed to 
 
SERV., R43453, THE RENEWABLE ELEC. PROD. TAX CREDIT: IN BRIEF 1 (2018) 
(The Tax Code further requires that the electricity be sold to an unrelated party.).  
370 Victoria Chang, Note, Wind Energy Incentives in Texas, 14 TEX. J. OIL 
GAS & ENERGY L. 189, 200 (2019). 
371 Sherlock, supra note 369, at 9. 
372 Gireesh Shrimali, Melissa Lynes, & Joe Indvik, Wind Energy 
Deployment in the U.S.: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Federal and State 
Policies, RENEWABLE AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVIEWS 43 (2015) 
796–806, 805.  
373 Id. at 806. 
374 Michelle D. Layser, Improving Tax Incentives for Wind Energy 
Production: The Case for a Refundable Production Tax Credit, 81 MO. L. REV. 
453, 455 (2016). 
375 Mormann, supra note 366, at 315. 
376 Chang, supra note 370, at 197-98. 
377 Sherlock, supra note 369, at 10. 
378 Travis Roach, The Effect of the Production Tax Credit on Wind Energy 
Production in Deregulated Electricity Markets, 127 ECON. LETTERS 86, 86 (2015). 
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renew it eleven times.379 On six of these occasions, Congress actually 
allowed the PTC to expire before extending it.380 Figure 3 illustrates 
this history of the PTC’s availability and its impact on wind power 
installations. 
 
Figure 3381 
 
 
 
 The PTC’s erratic availability reduced its effectiveness. The 
Department of Energy analyzed the effect of the starts and stops of the 
credit on the ability of developers to plan their projects. It used the date 
of congressional enactment and the expiration of the PTC to calculate 
a planning window for each PTC period.382 The Department found that 
 
379 Ferrey, supra note 171, at 358 (identifying ten extensions as of 2018); 
John A. Eliason, David B. Weisblat, & Tori Roessler, Production Tax Credit 
Extended for Renewable Projects Beginning Construction in 2020, 10 NAT’L L. 
REV. (2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/production-tax-credit-
extended-renewable-projects-beginning-construction-2020 ( In 2019, Congress 
extended the PTC an eleventh time to be available for projects commencing in 
2020.).  
380 Ferrey, supra note 171, at 358. 
381 Isaac Orr, Don’t Believe the Wind Industry’s Steel Tariff Talk, they 
Always Wanted More Subsidies, CTR. OF THE AM. EXPERIMENT (Oct.16, 2019), 
https://www.americanexperiment.org/2019/10/dont-believe-the-wind-industrys-
steel-tariff-talk-they-always-wanted-more-subsidies/. 
382 Ryan Wiser & Mark Bollinger, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 2017 WIND 
TECHNOLOGIES MARKET REPORT 67 (2018). 
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14 such periods have arisen since 1992, and the average length of these 
periods was only 27.5 months.383 
 
 These regular expirations and extensions negatively impacted 
wind development.384 They also engendered boom-and-bust cycles in 
the industry.385 As illustrated by Figure 3, the cycles exhibit strong 
growth followed by dramatic slowdowns.386 During the slowdowns, 
installations fell from 76% to as much as 93%.387 These boom-and-
bust cycles caused a number of problems within the wind industry 
itself and its supporting industries.388 The drop in demand destabilized 
the industry’s labor force and disrupted manufacturing processes and 
supply chains.389 These disruptions impaired the industry’s ability to 
take advantage of favorable developments, such as the tax credits’ 
renewal or strong market conditions.390 They also increased prices for 
goods and labor.391 
 
 These cycles do, however, demonstrate the impact of the PTC 
on the wind industry.392 The effectivenss of the PTC is apparent by the 
dropoff in installations illustrated by Figure 3 when Congress allowed 
the PTC to expire. Consequently, Congress has amended the PTC to 
apply to additional technologies, including biomass, geothermal, 
landfill gas, municipal solid waste, qualified hydropower, and marine 
and hydrokinetic facilities.393  
 
 
383 Id. (The author calculated more periods than extensions because, in 
some instances, the extensions provided that different investment periods would 
receive different credit amounts. For instance, the 2014 extension allowed a 100% 
credit for construction started before 2017, but only 80% for construction 
commenced before 2018.).   
384 Klass, supra note 369, at 41-42. 
385 Chang, supra note 370, at 196-97. 
386 Production Tax Credit for Renewable Energy, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS (Feb. 9, 2015) [hereinafter, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS], 
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/production-tax-credit-renewable-energy.  
387 Id. 
388 Blake Harrison, Expanding the Renewable Energy Industry Through 
Tax Subsidies Using the Structure and Rationale of Traditional Energy Tax 
Subsidies, 48 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 845, 866 (2015). 
389 Id. 
390 Chang, supra note 370, at 197, n.58. 
391 Id.  
392 Mormann, supra note 366, at 319.  
393 Id. at 313; SHERLOCK, supra note 369 at 1 (In 1992, the PTC included 
only closed-loop biomass along with wind.) (By 2017, Congress had amended the 
PTC to cover the additional technologies.).  
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 Another tax credit that Congress used to stimulate renewable 
energy was the investment tax credit (“ITC”). Congress first applied 
the ITC to renewable energy investments in the Energy Tax Act of 
1978.394 In contrast to the PTC, which rewards electricity 
generation,395 the ITC mainly rewards the investment in equipment 
that enables that generation.396 Thus, the ITC does not require – and, 
consequently, does not ensure – the actual generation of electricity by 
renewable sources. The ITC provides a credit of 30% of the investment 
in renewable energy equipment.397  
 
 Investors typically used the PTC for their investments in wind 
power, while the ITC has been the credit of choice for investment in 
solar power.398 The distinction arose largely because of the differences 
in electricity generation by the two sources of power.399 Historically, 
the per kilowatt capital cost of solar has been higher than that of wind. 
Thus, the ITC was more attractive for solar investments than those in 
wind.400 Conversely, wind’s higher generating capacity made the PTC 
more appealing to its investors.401 In fact, the PTC could provide up to 
double the credit for wind developments that some solar projects could 
earn.402 
 
 Conclusions about the success of the ITC in incentivizing solar 
energy investments are mixed. Investment in solar power has 
undergone a significant increase since the passage of the ITC.403 
 
394 Mormann, supra note 366, at 314.  
395 Chang, supra note 370, at 200. 
396 Mormann, supra note 366, at 314. 
397 Klass, supra note 369, at 38. 
398 Ferrey, supra note 171, at 354. 
399 Id.; Simon P.Neill & M. Reza Hashemi, Fundamentals of Ocean 
Renewable Energy: Generating Electricity from the Sea, 28 (Mariana Kuhl ed., 
2018) (A renewable source’s capacity factor refers to the actual electricity 
generated in a year divided by the maximum possible electicity that could have 
been produced.); E. Ela, V. Diakov, E. Ibanez, & M. Heaney. Golden, Impacts of 
Variability and Uncertainty in Solar Photovoltaic Generation at Multiple 
Timescales, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. [NREL] (May, 2013), 
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/58274.pdf (Capacity factors are important with 
renewable energy sources because their electricity generation is variable over 
multiple timescales.).   
400 Ferrey, supra note 171, at 354-55.  
401 Id. at 355. 
402 Id. at 356. 
403 Brian Palumbo, Looking in the Side-View Mirror: Assessing the 
Current and Future State of the Solar Energy Industry as It Reaches the 
Mainstream, 41 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 183, 191 (2016). 
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Nevertheless, a number of considerations call into question the ITC’s 
role in causing this rise. For instance, the acceleration in solar 
installations does not coincide with favorable changes to the ITC.404 
Furthermore, solar energy has grown at similar levels worldwide.405 
Finally, analysts generally consider the PTC to yield more renewable 
energy per dollar of subsidy than has the ITC.406  
 
 Because of the necessity of having income to benefit from the 
tax credits, the government turned to a different mechanism during the 
Great Recession. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 (the Stimulus Bill) established section 1603 cash grants.407 This 
provision enabled developers to choose to receive cash grants of up to 
30% of their investments instead of receiving either the production or 
investment tax credits.408 Congress enacted this provision in 
recognition of reduced investor demand for tax credits during the 
recession.409  
 
 Since cash grants provide financial benefits directly to 
investors, they have certain advantages over tax credits. Credits, as 
discussed before, require developers either to generate taxable income 
to benefit from the credit or to engage outside investors to monetize 
their tax beneifts.410 As a result, a significant portion of the subsidy 
goes to the outside investors and to efforts to identify and attract 
them.411  Consequently, analysts have concluded that one dollar of 
direct cash has twice the benefit of one dollar of tax credit.412 Not 
surprisingly, in the period after the passage of the Stimulus Bill, 
developers demonstrated a clear preference for cash grants over the tax 
credits.413 
 
 Another criterion upon which to evaluate these three 
mechanisms is their allocation of project risks. Since the PTC rewards 
production, project developers assume the risk of its 
 
404 Id. at 201-02. 
405 Id. at 203. 
406 SHERLOCK, supra note 369, at 10. 
407 Mormann, supra note 366, at 316. 
408 Id. 
409 Id. 
410 SHERLOCK, supra note 369, at 10. 
411 Mormann, supra note 366, at 324. 
412 Id. at 322. 
413 Id. at 323. 
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nonperformance.414 Conversely, the value of the ITC to the developer 
depends upon the amount of its investment, not its production.415 Thus, 
the ITC does not assure electricity generation. Similarly, the 
government determines the amount of Section 1603 grants with 
reference to developer investments, not electricity generation.416 Thus, 
the PTC better assures that the targeted benefit will actually be 
produced.  
 
IV. USING RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES TO INCREASE CDR 
DIFFUSION 
 
 Diffusion theory and experience with renewable energy can 
help inform the crafting of policies to incentivize the development and 
deployment of CDR. The renewable energy experience suggests 
several principles that should guide these policies. Policies should 
provide for differentiation along a series of criteria, be stable until 
technologies are able to mature, but be able to adapt to new 
circumstances as technologies do reach later stages of diffusion. The 
renewable energy experience suggests that FITs are robust supporters 
of new technologies. However, they might work best operating in an 
RPS structure that assures steady growth while incentivizing least-cost 
technologies. At early stages of diffusion, additional policies that can 
subsidize new technologies, such as cash grants, have proven to be 
effective. As technologies become mature, subsidies need to be 
reduced and replaced with policies such as tenders that will contain 
costs. 
 
A. Principles to Guide CDR Policies 
 
 Diffusion theory and the recent experiences with renewable 
energy development suggest several principles that should guide 
policies intended to promote CDR. A critical principle that must be 
incorporated into CDR policies is differentiation. To best promote 
CDR technologies, policy makers should develop technology-specific, 
rather than technology-neutral, policies.417 Policies must differentiate 
among technologies to take into account different stages of 
development, to recognize disparate geographic resources, and to 
assure the development of a variety of different technologies. Tailoring 
 
414 Id. at 322. 
415 Id. 
416 Id. 
417 IEA, Deploying Renewables, supra note 61, at 100. 
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policies to specifc technologies facilitates the development of less 
mature – and typically more expensive – technologies.418 Experience 
with renewable energy illustrates that technologies develop at different 
paces,419 necessitating policies targeted to their different locations on 
the S curve.420 Similarly, CDR technologies currently are at different 
levels of development,421 and, therefore, will benefit from the adoption 
of policies that allow for differentiation.  
 
 Differentiation will have additional benefits. It will enable 
rates to recognize the geographic disparity of resources.422 It also 
lowers the overall costs of the policies, since differentiation facilitates 
reducing support for technologies further along on the diffusion 
curve.423   
 
 Tailoring is also important to avoid leaving technologies 
undeveloped. Essentially, those benefits that arise with technology 
maturity – economies of scale and learning by doing – become 
hindrances to the development of other technologies. Positive 
feedbacks and increasing returns to scale foster path dependency.424 
Path dependency locks in established technologies, not because they 
are superior, but because they are widely used.425 
 
 Once again, renewable energy provides examples of these 
concepts. For instance, the potential for Spain to generate significant 
quantities of electricity through solar power is substantial.426 
Nevertheless, Spain’s policies favored wind power and locked in wind 
technology over others, including solar.427 Another energy source that 
globally remains largely fallow is tidal power. Typical estimates 
calculate that tidal energy generation could exceed 100 GW 
 
418 Del Rıo, supra note 272, at 277. 
419 IEA, Deploying Renewables, supra note 61, at 95.  
420 Id. at 97.  
421 Greenhouse Gas Removal, THE ROYAL SOC’Y (Sept. 2018), 
https://royalsociety.org/-/media/policy/projects/greenhouse-gas-removal/royal-
society-greenhouse-gas-removal-report-2018.pdf. 
422 Shrimali, supra note 372, at 806. 
423 IEA, Deploying Renewables, supra note 61, at 100; Del Rıo, supra 
note 272, at 277 (Failure to reduce subsidies in recognition of the declining costs of 
mature technologies often results in windfall profits for them.).  
424 Sandén, supra note 188, at 1559. 
425 Id. 
426 Rao, supra note 54, at 1073.  
427 Id.  
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worldwide.428 Nevertheless, a lack of support for tidal power research 
has limited its development. Recently, Naval Group SA, a pioneer in 
tidal power, decided to shift its focus to offshore wind power because 
of limited support for tidal energy and competition from offshore 
wind.429 Other recent decisions by France to limit support for tidal 
projects and by the United Kingdom to require tidal projects to 
compete with offshore wind influenced Naval Group’s decision.430 
The United Kingdom’s focus on offshore wind indirectly impacted 
marine technologies by limiting their relative competitiveness.431 To 
avoid such results, CDR technology policy needs to maintain support 
for still-developing technologies before their ultimate value has 
become apparent.432 This will be especially important since analyses 
conclude that multiple CDR technologies should be developed to 
sequester the amount of carbon required.433 
 
 Experience with renewable energy also demonstrates that 
stability enhances the effectiveness of policies. The contrast between 
the results in Germany434 with FITs and the uneven history of wind 
power installations in the United States435 illustrates the importance of 
this factor. As demonstrated by the wind PTC, short-term extensions 
and occasional expirations of the credit injected uncertainty into the 
wind power market, leading to drops in installations greater than 
90%.436 Not only did this disrupt the clear upward trend in 
installations,437 it also impacted the wind industry’s employment, 
finances, and supply chain.438 Conversely, Germany structured its FIT 
 
428 Lee Buchsbaum, MeyGen Array Sets Global Records for Harnessing 
Tidal Power, POWER (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.powermag.com/meygen-array-
sets-global-records-for-harnessing-tidal-power/. 
429 Brian Parkin, Tidal Power Shaken as Naval Group Drops Business for 
Wind Focus, BLOOMBERG L. ENV’T & ENERGY REPORT (July 27, 2018), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/tidalpowershaken-as-
naval-group-drops-business-for-wind-focus.). 
430 Id. 
431 Nolden, supra note 79, at 5. 
432 Lacerda, supra note 103, at 8240.  
433James Mulligan, et al., CarbonShot: Federal Policy Options for Carbon 
Removal in the United States, WORLD RES. INST. (Jan. 2020), 
https://files.wri.org/s3fs-public/carbonshot-federal-policy-options-for-carbon-
removal-in-the-united-states_1.pdf.  
434 See Section III, subsec. B.1. 
435 See Section III, subsec. E 
436 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 386. 
437 See Figure 3. 
438 Harrison, supra note 388, at 866. 
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to provide decades-long certainty to investors.439 Without doubt, this 
disparity helped wind power to achieve its fast growth in that 
country.440 
 
 Although CDR policies need to be stable, they must also be 
flexible. Diffusion theory tells us that technology deployment will 
follow a predictable – yet changing – pattern.441 In general, we can 
expect that CDR technologies will first undergo a period of innovation 
and early adoption.442 This phase is characterized by limited diffusion 
as costs remain high.443 During this period, supportive policies that 
lower the effective cost of installation will be especially helpful in 
promoting diffusion, since diffusion normally proceeds slowly.444 As 
CDR technologies advance to the adoption stages, the costs of 
installations can overwhelm governments relying upon subsidies.445 
Thus, policies will need to adapt to contain their overall costs.446 This 
will require regular reviews of market conditions to determine the 
optimal time to enact transitional policies.447 Alternatively, they could 
rely upon predetermined levels, typically overall cost or total 
installations, to implement changes in support.448 Regardless of the 
particular mechanism, the policies will need to be able to adapt as the 
technologies mature. 
 
B. A Policy Proposal to Support CDR Development and 
Deployment 
 
 Diffusion theory, the renewable energy experience, and the 
principles identified above can help guide the establishment of policies 
that can accelerate development and deployment of CDR technologies. 
At the initial stages, policies need to encourage investment, reduce 
costs, and provide stability. During the take-off stage, monitoring of 
changing conditions will be critical, with an expectation that policies 
will need either to evolve or be replaced to best fit new circumstances 
 
439 Suzuki, supra note 176. 
440 Fowlie, supra note 180. 
441 Davies, supra note 55, at 1229. 
442 IEA, Deploying Renewables, supra note 61, at 97. 
443 Id. 
444 Id. at 101. 
445 Id. at 102. 
446 Id.  
447 Id. at 103. 
448 Mormann, supra note 132, at 1662, n.231.  
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and to contain the overall costs of these policies. Finally, as markets 
begin to saturate, most policies can be removed altogether.  
 
 In light of the success demonstrated by FITs in promoting wind 
and solar power, FITs should be used as an initial policy to support 
technologies that capture and sequester carbon. Cost-based rates with 
premiums should be used since this method inherently differentiates 
among sources, which, among other benefits, supports portfolio 
diversification.449 FITs have several characteristics that should 
contribute to the acceleration of CDR installations. First, their 
premium rates will ensure that investors will receive a favorable return, 
thereby encouraging investment.450 Second, FITs incorporate long 
contract periods, which provide important stability for new 
technologies.451 By setting different rates for different technologies, 
FITs also can promote multiple technologies at once.452 Differentiated 
rates also can recognize geographic differences in technologies’ 
effectiveness and tailor rates accordingly,453 thereby controlling 
overall costs.454 
 
 FITs, however, have not proven to be perfect. Although FITs 
usually fostered substantial renewable energy growth,455 the costs of 
this growth led many FITs countries to abandon or severely restrict 
these policies as technologies matured.456 Both in Europe and Asia 
nations have been shifting away from FITs to market-based 
methods.457 In other instances, they failed to stimulate the anticipated 
growth in renewable energy.458 Thus, modifications will be required to 
ensure that CDR installations achieve their targeted level while 
avoiding burdensome costs. To ensure that installations continue even 
when FITs are reduced or eliminated, FITs should be used in 
conjunction with RPSs. 
 
 
449 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 41. 
450 Id. at 40; see also id. at 38 (To ensure profitability, a CDR FIT should 
thus commence with a cost-based rate.).  
451 Resch, supra note 140. 
452 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 41. 
453 Lacerda supra note 103, at 8246. 
454 IEA, Deploying Renewables, supra note 61, at 100.  
455 UNEP, Feed-in Tariffs, supra note 124, at 5. 
456 Section III, supra subsec. C.1. 
457 REN21, supra note 123, at 122. 
458 Kang, supra note 127, at 11. 
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 Typically, jurisdictions have approached the two policies as 
mutually exclusive alternatives.459 However, in recent years analysts 
have begun to suggest that FITs and RPSs can be used jointly, either 
as separate but parallel measures or with FITs serving to promote 
certain technologies within a broader RPS structure.460 Using the two 
policies jointly can be more effective since this approach is able to 
combine the policies’ most effective provisions.461 Furthermore, 
analysts have concluded that use of both policies increase their 
effectiveness.462 Importantly, both policies can support tailoring for 
specific technologies.463  
 
 The RPS structure can readily incorporate FITs policies.464 
RPSs can act as a framework with which other policies can be 
integrated to achieve the RPSs’ requirements.465 With their tradable 
certificates, RPSs create markets for technologies; FITs can encourage 
investment in the technologies intended to populate these markets466 
and help achieve the RPS quotas.467 Specifically, FITs and RPSs can 
interact in several ways. First, FITs can provide a more certain means 
to award contracts as compared to the competitive solicitation process 
typically used in RPS jurisdictions.468 Second, jurisdictions can use 
 
459 Mormann, supra note 132, at 1628. 
460 Cory, supra note 126, at 11. 
461 Kang, supra note 127, at 75. 
462 Fugui Dong, et al., Study on China’s Renewable Energy Policy Reform 
and Improved Design of Renewable Portfolio Standard, 2 ENERGIES 12, 2147 
(2019). 
463 Couture, supra note 136, at 18 (FITs can differentiate tariffs by 
technology type.); Buckman, supra note 340, at 4105 (RPSs, on the other hand, can 
target specific technologies by utilizing carve outs or multipliers.); see also EPA 
ENERGY & ENVRIONMENT GUIDE, supra note 339, at 5-10.  
464 EPA ENERGY & ENVRIONMENT GUIDE, supra note 339, at 5-11 (While 
a traditional RPS requires utilities to comply with their mandates, here the RPS 
mandate should be applied effectively as a carbon offset for industrites with high 
CO2 emissions. California, for instance, will allow carbon capture and 
sequestration as an offset to companies with high-carbon intensity fuels under its 
Low Carbon Fuel Standard.); see also Accounting and Permanence Protocol For 
Carbon Capture and Geological Sequestration Under Low Carbon Fuel Standard , 
CAL. AIR RES. BOARD (updated). 
465 Zhao Xin-Gang, et al., The Policy Effects of Feed-In Tariff and 
Renewable Portfolio Standard: A Case Study of China’s Waste Incineration Power 
Industry, 68, INT’L J. OF INTEGRATED WASTE MANAGEMENT, SCI. & TECH., 711–
723, 711-12, (2017).  
466 Mormann, supra note 132, at 1658. 
467 Couture, supra note 136, at 22. 
468 Id.  
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FITs to award contracts when no competitive solicitations are 
pending.469 Third, FITs can work in conjunction with RPSs, providing 
a means to promote targeted technologies.470 In place of or in addition 
to carve outs and multipliers, RPSs can utilize FITs to encourage 
investment into technologies jurisdictions favor or seek to develop. 
FITs can be especially helpful when RPSs are first implemented as a 
means to accelerate investment in undeveloped technologies.471 
Finally, because they lower barriers to market participation, FITs 
enable governments to encourage investment by small investors.472  
 
 Using the RPS framework provides several crucial benefits. 
RPSs can serve as baseline policies that assure smooth and continuous 
growth.473 RPSs can also be helpful after technologies have progressed 
along the diffusion curve.474 They can enable jurisdictions to avoid the 
financial burden of additional installations with FIT subsidies while 
assuring continued installations of the technology.475 As noted 
previously, South Korea replaced its FIT with an RPS, and renewable 
energy installations then increased three fold over their rate under the 
South Korean FIT.476 Furthermore, with their utilization of 
competitive markets to encourage investment in lowest-cost 
technologies, RPSs can help control the burden of FITs subsidies.477  
 
 One country that is combining FITs with RPSs is China. It is 
utilizing a portfolio approach to renewable energy development, 
combining RPS policies with FITs and other policies.478 As noted 
previously, China enacted its RPS in response to problems with its 
 
469 Id. 
470 Id.  
471 Xin-gang, supra note 465, at 721. 
472 Abolhosseini, supra note 161, at 879; Fell, supra note 114, at 11 ( 
Conversely, experience has demonstrated that another means to acquire renewable 
energy generation, tenders, raise barriers to participation by small investors.).  
473 Herman K. Trabish, Why Mandates Still Matter in the Age of Cheap 
Renewables, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/why-
mandates-still-matter-in-the-age-of-cheap-renewables/513797/. 
474 Abolhosseini, supra note 161, at 884. 
475 Xin-gang, supra note 465, at 721 (suggesting that FITs subsidies can 
be reduced or canceled as investments increase, thereby controlling costs. Policy 
makers can then increase RPS quotas to assure continued installations). 
476 Lo, supra note 126. 
477 Mormann, supra note 132, at 1628. 
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FIT.479 Specifically, the FIT incentivized the development of solar PV 
in resource-rich portions of the country, but low development also 
characterizes these regions.480 Becaue of a lack of long-distance 
transmission lines, this PV development – and its attendant costs – 
were wasted.481 China then imposed an RPS to control PV waste, to 
balance special deployment, and to contain policy cost.482 Thus, it 
turned to RPSs to assure controlled and directed growth while using 
FITs to incentivize that growth. 
 
 Finally, to enhance the effectiveness of these policies, 
governments should incorporate cash grants and tax credits. Because 
many CDR technologies are still nascent,483 we can anticipate that 
most CDR developers will have minimal taxable income for several 
years. Cash grants will usually be most effective in these 
circumstances since they will assure that a larger proportion of the 
government’s support will stay with the developers.484 Still, the 
production tax credits can be valuable tools to incentivize more mature 
technologies that are already able to produce the desired product, 
carbon sequestration.485 The final mix of subsidies may be less 
important than the fact that subsidies are available. From the 
perspective of investors, analysts have found that the extent of price 
support is at least as important as the type of instrument that provides 
it.486  
 
 As CDR technologies mature and enter the take-off phase, 
subsidies – FITs, grants, and tax credits – will need to be reduced to 
avoid excessively burdensome costs. Accordingly, administrators will 
need to monitor installations and overall costs. As both rise, they will 
need to degress the FIT rates and prepare to transition from subsidies 
to tenders.487 Experience demonstrates that auctions can work well 
 
479 Section III, supra subsec. B.3. 
480 Ye,  supra note 221, at 497. 
481 Id. 
482 Id. 
483 NAS, supra note 11, at 40. 
484 Mormann, supra note 366, at 324. 
485 Chang, supra note 370, at 200. 
486Valentina Dinica, Support Systems for the Diffusion of Renewable 
Energy Technologies—an Investor Perspective, 34, ENERGY POL’Y, 461, 463, 
(2006). 
487 See Exploring the role of the US Government in a future advance 
market commitment, GLOB. HEALTH TECH. COAL. (2011), 
https://www.ghtcoalition.org/pdf/AMC-Policy-Brief.pdf (Another policy similar to 
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either independently or in conjunction with broader structures, such as 
FITs or RPSs. Tenders can, for instance, serve several different 
functions within FITs. Jurisdictions can use tenders to procure larger 
projects,488 leaving FITs to support smaller installations.489 
Alternatively, governments can use tenders as a device to determine 
the appropriate price level for the FITs subsidies.490  
 
 The German experience illustrates another role for tenders. 
First, it used FITs to assure predictability of renewable energy 
investments. After the technologies matured, it then replaced its FITs 
with auctions, thereby not only controlling its subsidy costs but also 
lowering the price of energy.491 Tenders also have worked successfully 
within the RPS structure. New York492 and California493 provide 
examples of states that use tenders to secure renewable energy projects 
 
FITs that might better control overall costs is Advance Market Commitments 
(“AMCs”). AMCs arose as a means to incentivize the production of vaccines for 
developing countries.) (They consist of a pool of funds available to producers of 
specified products, in this case, vaccines. AMCs guarantee a market at a specific 
price.); What is an Advance Market Commitment?, CTR. FOR GLOB. DEV. (Feb. 18, 
2005), https://www.cgdev.org/blog/what-advance-market-commitment (Unlike 
FITs, however, they do not guarantee that all available products will be purchased.) 
(Thus, they still enable purchasers to select the best product for their purposes, 
thereby incentivizing manufactureres to improve their products.); Vivid 
Economics, supra note 269, at 18, 16 (AMCs increase revenues and reduce their 
volatility.) (By providing certainty regarding demand, AMCs stimulate 
investment.) (AMCs are most effective at supporting existing technologies or 
incremental R&D improvements.); GHTC, supra note 487, at 3 (They are 
especially appropriate for products that benefit society, but may not necessarily be 
profitable.); Christopher M. Snyder et. Al., Wills Begor, & Ernst R. Berndt, 
Economic Perspectives on the Advance Market Commitment, 30, HEALTH AFF. No. 
9 (Aug. 2011), 1508-1517, 1514-15 (2011) (Experience has demonstrated that 
AMCs accelerated the production and distribution of targeted vaccines, though 
other factors may also have had an effect.).  
488 COUTURE, supra note 295, at 5 (recognizing that, because of their 
administrative and transaction costs, tenders favor larger investors and larger 
projects). 
489 Fell, supra note 114, at 17-18 (concluding that for small projects 
jurisdictions should abandon the use of tenders and instead rely upon FITs). 
490 SCHENUIT, supra note 220, at 40.  
491Reed Landberg, BNA Environment & Energy Report: Germany Seeks to 
Become First to Auction Energy Efficiency Deals, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 10, 2018), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/germany-seeks-to-
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https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/RPS_Procurement_Programs/. 
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to satisfy RPS requirements. Furthermore, combining tenders with 
RPSs will overcome one of the common objections to tenders – 
underrealization of installation targets.494 The rising minimum 
requirements under RPSs will assure that installations will continue to 
achieve higher targets.495 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Virtually all projections conclude that keeping warming under 
2°C will require the use of CDR technologies, and in substantial 
quantities. Although many such technologies are available, few are 
ready to be deployed at scale, and many still require significant 
development. Diffusion theory helps demonstrate how this 
deployment may unfold, but, even more importantly, how policies may 
accelerate this process while containing its costs. The recent 
experience of renewable energy deployment points to several policies 
that may accelerate the diffusion of CDR technologies. The RPS 
structure can set rising targets for deployment and incentivize 
continual innovation of mature technologies. FITs provide conditions 
favorable to encouraging investment and deployment of still-
developing technologies. Importantly, however, FIT premiums must 
be reduced or eliminated as the technologies pass through the take-off 
stage of the S curve. At this point, RPS minimums and tenders should 
be able to ensure that diffusion continues and does so at the lowest 
costs possible.  
 
 
 
 
 
494 Kreiss, supra note 302, at 512. 
495 EPA, supra note 339, at 5-10. 
